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I. Introduction
Illegal drugs have become a key and conflictive policy issue in the Andean
countries. Anti-drug polices are today part of government policy agendas
and the object of frequent debate. In 1961 the United Nations signed the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This was followed by the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Drugs and the 1988 Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
In1972 President Nixon declared a “war on drugs” raising drug issues in
the policy agenda of the United States and other countries. It is clear that
governments’ have been attempting to control and regulate mind-altering drugs
use for a long time. Their results, however, have been at best highly
questionable. Today cocaine and heroin are widely available, new drugs have
appeared in the market, new markets have developed and new criminal and
subversive organizations entered the illegal drug business.  Advocates of current
policies would argue that without them things would be worse. Those who
oppose them content that policies themselves are at fault and have contributed
to increase the social costs of drug production, trafficking and consumption.
The debate about anti-drug policy effectiveness most of the time is emotionally
charged and does not advance the understanding of drug phenomena.
This essay analyses the nature of the drug policy formulation problem,
describes a theory of competitive advantage in illicit drugs, draws some
policy implications from this theory, analyses the characteristics of the main
drug producing countries that make them prone to develop the illicit drugs
industry, surveys the evolution of anti-drug policies in the Andean countries,
discuses some of the main challenges confronted by the policies currently
used, summarizes the main effects that the illegal drug industry development
have had on those countries, assesses the viability of drug policy reform and
makes a few suggestions to marginally modify some policies and to improve
policy dialogue as a pre-requisite to improve drug policy effectiveness.
* This paper was written with funding from the World Bank. The author thanks the comments
of Guillermo Perry and an anonymous referee who are exonerated from any responsibility.
The opinions expressed in this essay are the author’s and do not intent in any way to reflect
World Bank policies or opinions.
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II. The Nature of the Policy
Formulation Problem
Anti-drug policies have been formulated following a pattern frequently
found in common anti-crime policies. Unfortunately, there is no consensus
about the reasons why crime develops and grows in a society. Crime has
been associated to many factors: poverty, alienation, genetics, race, ethnicity,
gender, political sentiments and affiliation, family structure, education levels,
etc. Because crime causality is unclear, confusing and difficult to establish,
policy makers frequently opt to take measures that in their eyes and those of
social organizations and groups contribute to protect society from criminals.
In other words, protecting or to be seen as protecting law abiding citizens
take precedence over understanding causality. This creates a bias in favor
of repressive policies which has been the case when dealing with mind
altering illegal drugs. These have implicitly been formulated under simplistic
assumptions about the causality of illicit drug demand and supply.
Furthermore, issues related to mind altering drugs are deeply rooted in the
institutions, structure, values and mores of a society and in every society
there is strong resistance to analyze its internal structural and institutional
weaknesses. At the same time, it is very comforting to define the “drug
problem” as one rooted abroad. Historically the United States has tended to
define the “drug problem” as one generated by illicit drug supplies that inva-
de the country and has supported policies that “go to the source” in mainly
producing countries. The Andean countries on the other hand, have defined
the “drug problem” as one of demand: “when there is demand, there is
supply” is an assertion frequently made to justify illicit drug production and
the Andean governments’ inability to control illicit drug supply. These
exculpatory discourses are politically useful but they avoid a deeper analysis
and understanding of the underlining causes of the development of the illicit
drug market and lead to confrontational interpretations of policy motivations
and goals. Furthermore, they appeal to nationalist feelings that contribute to
polarize the drug policy debate and make policy evaluation very difficult,
increase distrust and become an obstacle to understanding opposite views.
In order to formulate effective policies it is necessary to understand the
root causes of drug consumption, trafficking and production. To do so it is
required to acknowledge the complexity and multi-disciplinary and
multidimensional aspects of mind-altering drugs’ issues. These have to do
with morals and ethics, public health, economics, politics, international relations,
anthropology, sociology, law and legal systems, statistics, chemistry, ecology
and other disciplines. The complexity and multi-disciplinary aspects of drug
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issues imply first, that no one can master all their aspects. Not surprisingly,
any policy based on a single discipline has a very high probability to generate
“unintended consequences” that prevent policy success.1
Second, the knowledge about many policy effects and policy interactions
is weak and uncertain. Indeed, the weakness in the knowledge about many
drug issues is remarkable. This is true not only in the social sciences but also
in the hard ones. For example, policies such as forced crop eradication,
laboratory destruction and mandatory jail sentences, among others, are justified
because of their deterrent effects. In fact, nobody knows the magnitude, if
any, of these effects which, in any case, are likely to vary across countries and
cultures. Forced eradication and alternative development policies aim to
substitute legal for illegal crops. There is evidence that these policies displace
illicit crops to other locations but no one knows the strength of this effect.
Similarly, aerial spraying of illicit crops in Colombia is implemented because
the state cannot eradicate manually but nobody knows the full magnitude of its
environmental effects due to the chemicals used or the displacement of people
and crops it generates. Similarly, nobody really knows the extent of coca plants’
development of resistance to the herbicides used.
On the demand side one can list many similar cases. For instance,
knowledge is very weak about which drugs are substitutes or complementary
of each other. Besides, cross-country drug consumption behaviors differ
and are likely to depend on cultural aspects. Questions such as why the
United States consumes a lot of cocaine and relatively little heroin and why
Western Europe consumes a lot of heroin relative to cocaine are never
raised.2  Current policies assume that marihuana is an “entry” drug that
leads to the use of other more dangerous drugs such as cocaine and heroin
and this assumption cannot be questioned or tested.3
1 Some economist designed policies might have political reactions that prevent obtaining the
results sought. Policies designed by political scientists frequently lead to negative economic
effects. Policies designed to eliminate illegal crops can have devastating effects on the environment
and so on. Some authors think of these “unintended consequences” as just a policy effect (Tullis,
1995) rather than the result of policies formulated using very narrow approaches.
2 The typical economist’s answer that “tastes” account for this difference is not satisfactory
and avoids the real issue.
3 The evidence shows that most cocaine, heroin and amphetamine users in the United States
and Europe have used marijuana before. It also shows that most marijuana users do not go on
to use cocaine and heroin. Furthermore, cocaine and heroin users disproportionably come
from broken homes, have had abortions and premature births and have consumed alcohol
and tobacco. Yet, nobody things of criminalizing these “entry” behaviors to cocaine and
heroin use. Questions aiming to clarify the link between marijuana and harder drugs such as:
does marijuana use create a craving for other drugs? Or do hard drug users have personalities
prone to exploration, experimentation that would have led them to hard drugs if marijuana
were not available, cannot not be raised in the policy making process.
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Uncertainty also extends into the realm of morals and ethics. Let’s
consider, for example, two cases: a parent who supports penalization of
drug possession to protect his or her children from drug dealers, and another
who supports decriminalization to make sure that his or her children’s lives
are not ruined by a life-time criminal record if they make a mistake. Which
of these two parents has the moral high ground? The choice between these
two positions depends on individual values and one cannot argue that one is
absolutely superior to the other.
The role of morals and ethics in drug policy formulation presents other
problems. First, there is no agreement about the role of mind-altering drugs
in human life. There are at least two conflicting positions held by those who
argue that the only legitimate uses for mind-altering drugs are medical and
research and by those who argue that there is room for recreational and other
uses. These positions vary significant across cultures that can be classified
in two groups: cultures that consider that mind-altered states of mind are a
legitimate part of the human experience and those that argue that they should
not be.4    Current policies and the United Nations Conventions allow only
medical and research uses for drugs in their “Schedule 1.” These include
coca and cocaine, opium and heroin, marijuana, amphetamines and other
commonly used drugs. For those who do not accept recreational, ritualistic
and other uses, any use outside medicine and scientific research is considered
abuse. For them, the only possible policy goal for drugs that today do not
have medical uses is to ban them.5  The issue for those who consider that
there is room for recreational and other uses is not to eliminate drugs but to
allow their controlled and restricted use in order to limit the social costs
generated by possible drug abuse.6
The lack of consensus goes much beyond moral and ethical issues. There
are several interpretations about the motivations behind the formulation of
anti drug policies. Many Latin American intellectuals, for example, deny the
importance of ethical and moral issues in the formulation of prohibitionist
policies and provide a purely economic and imperialist motivation. “Far from
generating any wealth in Colombia, (illegal drugs) have drown the country in
corruption and violence. In the United States the drug business increases its
gross domestic product; in Colombia it destroys it” (Caballero 1996: 139).
4 Ancient Greece and many American native cultures clearly fall in the first category. Puritan
societies clearly falls on the second.
5 Cocaine is a good local anesthetic, particularly for some eye surgery procedures, but it has
very good substitutes that make it unnecessary today.
6 There could be a few extremists who would argue that people should be allowed to use mind
altering drugs without any restrictions, but they make a very marginal group with few
adherents outside fringe social groups.
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Statements like this do not have any support in economics, but they are
generalized in the Andean countries and make virtually impossible a fruitful
dialogue among those holding opposite views.7
The lack of consensus about the uses of drugs and policy goals reflect
deep cultural differences among societies that lead to conflictive views. It
can be argued that in regards to drugs and drug policies affecting the Andean
countries, “there are three very important muted conflicts. First, a conflict
between American Puritanism that seeks to punish those who break moral
norms and the Latin Americans’ anomie that rejects those norms as an
improper imposition by the state and convinces them that they ‘know’ that
behind every policy there are hidden economic interests.  Second, a conflict
between American Puritanism and European pragmatism that seeks to lower
the social costs associated to drugs. Finally, a conflict within the Andean
societies between the elite in exclusionary political systems and the Indians,
peasants and urban groups that feel excluded from power and that see in
the drug industry an instrument that gives them power and the ability to
climb socially” (Thoumi, 2005).
Despite the glaring knowledge gaps and uncertainty, the strong convictions
of those who advocate particular policies, and the difficulties in questioning
them, allow policy advocates to act as if policies were formulated with
certitude and accurate knowledge about their effects. In fact, most anti-
drug policies have been reactive to political pressures and are formulated
without asking basic demand and supply causality questions and without
having a reasonable idea about their probability of success.
Summarizing, drug policy formulation and implementation have been
influenced by many factors that transcend drug issues and involve basic
values, beliefs and attitudes. In fact, policies toward mind-altering drugs like
those related to gender, gambling, religious tolerance and political dissent
have been culturally and institutionally determined in every society and provide
a fertile battlefield for the cultural clashes that arise in the globalization
process. These clashes are exacerbated by attempts to homogenize those
policies across countries.
The complexity, weak knowledge, multi disciplinary aspects and culturally
diverse interpretations of all drug related issues indicate that there is no
single reasonable way to deal with mind-altering drugs. Any sensible
7 For this statement to be valid, it is necessary to show how prohibitionist policies that
increase the price of cocaine and heroin imports in the United States, increase aggregate
demand in that country. If this were valid, we had found a very innovative development
theory based on illegality that would prescribe the prohibition of common imports such as
cigarettes and cellular telephones to increase their prices and the profits of domestic criminal
organizations in developing countries, with in turn would increase their national income.
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policymaking process must take these factors into account and also allow
for policy adaptation and evolution in response to changing realities and increases
in knowledge. In fact, drug policies have been formulated in a way that
resembles a trial and error process with a high probability of failure. Success
requires the capacity to change course in response to institutional changes and
policy evaluations, a feature lacking in the current policy making process.8
One way in which drug policy formulation can be advanced is simply asking
the hard causality questions mentioned above: why does a country produce
or consume drugs when many do not? Or why does a country produce or
consume drugs at one point in time and not at another? Currently these
questions are not asked and policies respond to simple questions of the “how
to” rather than “why” type. For example, when asking how can cocaine
supply be lowered? One simple answer is eradicating coca plantings. Because
this answer is based on simplistic assumptions about why peasants grow
coca, instead on an understanding of their decision making process and the
ways peasants look at the world, the probability of long-term policy success
is quite low. Unfortunately, “why” type questions frequently produce answers
that are not politically palatable or “correct” and they tend to be avoided.
III. The Competitive Advantage in Illegal Drugs
There is no question that demand played a role in the development of the
illicit Andean drug industry, but there is also no question that if demand and
profitability were the determinants of illicit drug production, the illicit industry
would not have grown following the pattern it did. A simple look at the
geographical distribution of the illicit industry raises important questions about
the role of profitability in its development. Indeed, if profits determined location,
illicit drugs, a very high profit industry would grow in every location that had
the inputs necessary for its development. In other words, the industry would
spread to all countries where it could be established. This is clearly the case
of legal industries that have simple, stable and known technologies and require
labor skills that are common around the world. The production of coca-
cocaine and poppy-opium-heroin clearly fit this description.
8 Many policy makers do not acknowledge this fact and indeed, argue that they do adapt their
polices to changing realities. For example, María Victoria Restrepo, the Director of the
Alternative Development program, part of Plan Colombia, explained at a seminar on Alternative
Development policies at the Universidad de Los Andes on September 7, 2004, that the new programs
have been formulated reflecting the lessons from the past. These lessons were drawn, however,
to improve the programs but never considered the possibility to drop the programs. In other
words, current policies could be improved but the current policy strategy could not be questioned.
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Opium and coca paste must be produced near or at the producing farms
but heroin and cocaine can be refined anywhere in the world.9  Indeed, the
production processes of these drugs are characterized by production functions
typical of footloose industries.
Contrary to the expectation of a widespread spatial distribution, the illegal
drugs industry is highly concentrated in a few countries. Furthermore, several
countries that were important producers in the past, when those drugs were
legal, do not produce illegal drugs now despite their profitability.  During the
last 44 years, since the Single Convention of the United Nations made coca
and cocaine illegal, coca production has been concentrated in Bolivia, Co-
lombia and Peru. The shares of coca production of these three countries
have varied through time but their total has accounted for over 95% of coca
production throughout this period.10  Interestingly, during the first 40 years of
the XX Century, while cocaine was legal, the largest coca suppliers to the
cocaine industry were Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan (Gagliano, 1994,
and Gootenberg, 1999).11
Beginning in the early 1970s Colombia concentrated illegal cocaine
manufacturing and since then it has remained the largest cocaine producer in the
world. By the mid-1990s it had also become the largest coca grower in the world.
Opium poppy can grow in a larger number of countries than coca but its
production is also concentrated in a few countries. In 2003 three countries
(Afghanistan, Laos and Myanmar) accounted for 91.5% of the world’s illegal
acreage of poppy and 95% of the potential opium output (UNODC, 2004: vol. II,
205). Adding Mexico and Colombia, the two next largest producers that supply the
American market, these shares increase to 96.8 and 97.9% respectively.
Data on synthetic drug production are much weaker than that for plant
based drugs for which estimates based on the cultivated areas can be
obtained. The United Nations uses laboratory seizures as a proxy for synthetic
drug production. These data also show very high concentration. In 2001
Australia, Russia and the United States accounted for about 90% of all the
amphetamine and methamphetamine laboratories seized (UNODC, 2004:
9 In the late XIX and early XX centuries coca leaves were traded internationally and processed
at great distances from the crop locations (Gagliano,1994). At that time large laboratories
maintained a monopoly on refining technology that by today’s standards is quite simple and
well known. Thus, today there is no need to incur in the high transportation costs and risks
incurred in coca leaf international trade.
10 The United Nations data show that currently only these three countries grow coca (UNODC,
2004)
11 Indeed, Peruvians complained bitterly of not being able to export coca until the “Japanese
occupation of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) and the British coca outlets in Asia
closed important supply sources for the United States and its wartime allies. Peruvian coca
was sought to fill the need” (Gagliano, 1994: 147).
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vol. II). Other less known illicit drugs like khat, peyote and yajé are also
produced in very few countries or regions. Marijuana is the only illicit plant
grown in a large number of countries.
The striking differences between the geographical pattern of licit and
illicit production highlight the importance of illegality in determining production
location. To understand why these patterns differ, it is necessary to find
what it is required to produce illegal goods that it is not required to produce
legal goods. In order to produce illegal drugs it is necessary to perform
“several industry-specific tasks that are not required by licit activities:
1. To trade in illegal inputs, which are frequently controlled substances and
have to be smuggled and/or obtained on an underground market.
2. To grow illegal crops.
3. To develop clandestine drug manufacturing systems.
4. To sell illegal products on the domestic market.
5. To smuggle the final product out of the country.
6. To develop illegal marketing networks abroad.
7. To transport illegally obtained currency across international borders and
to exchange these funds from one currency to another without revealing
their origin.
8. To launder and invest illegally obtained funds, and to manage portfolios
of illegally obtained capital.
The successful performance of these tasks requires special ‘illegal skills’
used to develop illegal business organizations, social support networks to
protect the industry from law enforcement efforts, and contract enforcement
and conflict resolution system within the criminal organizations, and to have
the will to break economic laws and regulations and to use violence if
necessary” (Thoumi, 2003a: 56).
The point is quite simple. Once a good or service is made illegal across
the world, illegality generates competitive advantages in countries or locations
where the rule of law is weak and prohibition laws and norms are socially or
culturally dismissed.
All societies have confronted the problem of controlling and regulating
individual behaviors that are deemed to generate social costs. Societies have
differed in their assessment of what behaviors have to be controlled. These
have included, among others, political and religious dissent, certain sexual and
gender behaviors, the use of mind-altering drugs, gambling, arms and weapons’
possession and use, interracial marriage and socializing and the like.12
12 Escohotado (1999) shows how mind-altering drugs have been used by all societies. They
have always been associated to medicine and religion that have regulated their use.
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Once a particular individual behavior is deemed to require regulation and
control, societies have several options open to them. These involve three
types of controls imposed by the state, other social institutions and those
internalized by individuals through socialization and education. These three
types of controls are interrelated and they may either complement or conflict
with each other. In a harmonious country, state laws and regulations would
reflect social mores and individuals’ internalized controls and all controls
reinforce each other. In countries where there is a significant degree of
cultural diversity, state controls might conflict with the social mores of some
groups. In these cases, successful behavior control requires a greater degree
of state repression. In other words, when state norms are reinforced by and
reflect social mores, law enforcement is easy. Otherwise, the rule of law
becomes very difficult to enforce.
A short survey of the characteristics of countries, regions and social
groups that are actors in the illegal drugs industry highlights the importance
of the rule of law and a central state that enforces it across its territory. As
noted, coca production is concentrated in three countries: Colombia, Bolivia
and Peru but Colombia has concentrated cocaine manufacturing and
developed the best trafficking networks. Illegal poppy and opium production
is also concentrated in Afghanistan, Myanmar and Laos and in the past it
was produced in significant quantities in the Northwest Frontier Province of
Pakistan, in Turkey and in isolated areas of Thailand.
Bolivia and Peru have bi-national societies in which large Indian
populations have been excluded from power and exploited during several
centuries by a white and mestizo dominant group. Coca cultivation in Bolivia
and Peru until the late 1960s was directed to the local market and done by
peasants and Indians who were not stakeholders in mainstream society.
Coca and poppy are grown in Colombia in recently settled areas where the
state has had a very weak presence.13  Many of the settlers in these areas
arrived displaced by political violence. The residents of all these areas consider
themselves abandoned by the state. In many instances, left and right wing
guerrillas have substituted the state and established order in those regions.
 Drug trafficking has frequently provided funds to support insurgent and
independence movements: FARC and ELN in Colombia, Shinning Path and the
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru, the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and similar groups in Chechnya, Albania, Kosovo, and other countries
13 Some could argue that in places like Putumayo peasants’ settlements have not been recent
because they settled 30 or 40 years ago. However, one wonders if this is time enough to
develop strong roots and social controls on behavior.
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and nations. Interestingly, illegal drugs also have funded counter-insurgency
movements like AUC in Colombia and the Contras in Nicaragua.14
Colombia has concentrated cocaine and heroin manufacturing in the
Andean countries. The two large original Colombian “cartels” located in
Medellín and Cali were composed by individuals who had strong social
exclusion feelings for whom drug trafficking was a legitimate way to enrich
themselves and compete with the traditional elite (Salazar, 2001, ch. 1, Arango,
1988, ch. 5, Chaparro, 2005, ch. 6).
Ethnic minorities and individuals who do not have strong loyalties to
mainstream society have been the core of drug trafficking networks in the
United States. During prohibition (1919-1932) American criminal organizations
were predominantly made up by Italian, Irish and Jewish immigrants. In the
late XX Century Jamaicans, Colombians, Nigerians, Haitians, Mexicans and
native groups such as the Crips, the Bloods and the Hell Angels that were
out of the social mainstream made up most trafficking networks.
The picture that arises from this short survey is clear. Many communities
where coca and poppy have had traditional uses grow those crops. They
have been isolated and/or excluded from the social mainstream in the countries
where they are located. Cocaine and heroin producers and traffickers are
also part of groups with very little loyalty towards the central state. Some
are good old-fashioned criminals, but many are part of organizations that
want to overthrow the government or to achieve autonomy or independence.
The arguments sketched in this essay (developed at length in Thoumi,
2003a) are consistent with the “new” international trade theory that stresses
institutional and cultural elements as sources of the competitive advantage
of a country (Landes, 1998, Porter, 2000, De Ferranti, Perry, Lederman and
Maloney, 2002). This theory based on extensive empirical evidence shows
that globalization and a large decline in transportation costs have weakened
the importance of the traditional production factors (capital, labor, technology
and natural resources) as determinants of the wealth of nations and the
composition of a country’s exports, Successful development in the current
world depends on a society’s capacity to increase the productivity of its
factors of production. This in turn depends among other elements on the
knowledge of and distance to large markets, public infrastructure, the quality
of institutions, the work force’s discipline and the ability to deliver “just on
time”. This theory agrees with arguments that institutional and structural
weaknesses and cultural elements (values, beliefs and attitudes) determine
illegal competitive advantages in illegal activities.
14 See for example Gugliota and Leen (1990) and Scott and Marshall (1991) for documentation
about the Sandinista and contras connections to the drug trade respectively.
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IV. Policy Implications of the Competitive
Advantage Theory of Drug Production
This quick look at the illegal drug industry indicates that illicit drug
production takes place because of issues relating to institutions, governance
and culture. Profitability is a necessary condition for production and trafficking,
but it is certainly not a sufficient condition for any of those activities. Production
requires the presence of other factors besides high potential profits. The
real policy challenge consists in identifying those factors and changing them
to prevent the growth of the illicit industry.
Most anti-drug policies attack drug profits. These policies either aim to
lower profits for producers and to increase risks and costs for all actors in
the illegal industry. An important basic question, is what results can be
accomplished going after a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
development of an illegal activity? A simple answer is that results depend on
the policies’ ability to eliminate the necessary condition. Unfortunately, current
repressive policies do not have this capacity. Indeed, some anti-drug policies
work at cross-purposes in this respect: they seek to lower the revenues
received by peasants and increase the retail prices of cocaine and heroin
raising profits at the retail end of the market. Policies aiming to achieve
these goals can succeed only if they eliminate market incentives for production
in every location where drugs can be produced. To do so it is necessary to
establish and maintain indefinitely a very high level of repression in the
presence of increased potential retail profits, an impossible task with the
resources and technology available today.
 Repressive policies are promoted by the United States, but prohibitionism
is supported by an overwhelming majority of the countries and societies in
the world. Indeed, it may be said that the world is prohibitionist. A list of
prohibitionist countries includes today, the United States, Sweden, all Eastern
European countries and those of the former Soviet Union, all Islamic nations,
China, Japan and other South Eastern Asian countries, all South Saharan
African countries and many Latin American and Caribbean Nations. A
deviation from this pattern is found among several Western European
countries that want to deepen their experiments with harm reduction policies
on the consumption side, and a few drug producing countries that have
suffered the negative consequences of the increased influence of the illegal
economy and organized crime. The deviance of the Western European
countries is quite mild. Their efforts are in the direction toward a public
health approach to drug consumption problems but none of those countries
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advocate liberalizing drug production, much less a free, unregulated drug
market. In this sense they support a less drastic form of prohibitionism.
Andean and other drug producing countries must face the fact that illegal
drug profitability will continue during the foreseeable future. As noted,
profitability is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for illicit drug
production. In order to produce drugs there are other necessary factors
such as an appropriate institutional environment and a culture that encourage
individuals to take advantage of illegal market opportunities. This presents
an interesting policy problem. In order to succeed through repressive policies,
Andean countries must eliminate illicit drug profitability within their borders
in the presence of external profitability. To achieve this goal, the level of
repression necessary would be extremely high, so much so that it will be
socially and politically unacceptable.15  Indeed, the level of repression required
to achieve a particular goal is inversely proportional to the extent of the rule
of law and social controls. Since the illegal industry locates itself in the
countries and regions were the rule of law is weakest, it is precisely in those
societies were repressive polices would have to be the strongest in order to
achieve any result.16  Even in this case, it would be necessary to have
uncorruptable law enforcement officials, otherwise the stronger the pressure
the more opportunities for corruption and the lower the chances of success.
Not surprisingly, drug policy success through repressive means in the Andean
countries would require a large sacrifice in human rights and other policy
goals such as sacrificing the environment.
An important lesson from the analysis of the competitive advantage in
illegal activities is that as long as the rule of law in drug producing societies
remains low, repressive policies will have to be very strong and will at best
achieve short-term successes unless extreme repression is maintained
indefinitely, a very unlikely scenario. This is why to guarantee long-term
success it is necessary to establish the rule of law. In other words, the “drug
problem” in drug producing countries is a structural, institutional and cultu-
ral, not a simple policy problem to be tackled with traditional policy
prescriptions. The current policy debate is framed as a confrontation between
“legalizers” and “criminalizers” who advocate different policies. From the
point of view of the Andean drug producing countries the real long-term issue
is how to develop social behavioral controls and how to strengthen the rule of
law. Without these, they will not achieve a long-term solution to the “drug
problem.”
15 This is why in these countries some people clamor for international “legalization,” that is,
for an external solution to their policy problem.
16 Putting this in simple terms, the level of repression required to control an illegal market in
Norway is much lower than in Colombia.
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The role of traditional repressive policies raises other important issues.
First, to what extent current policies complement or conflict with each other
or generate “unintended consequences” effects that neutralize the effects of
other policies and second, whether these policies are complementary or will
conflict with the social changes needed to achieve long-term success. An
important issue is whether policies designed to produce some short-run results
will conflict with the deeper changes required to achieve long-term success.
Current policies frequently conflict with each other and generate “unin-
tended consequences”. For example, forced eradication tends to displace
plantings to new areas. This, so called, “balloon effect” means that policy
success is only local but that globally, eradication might have little or no long-
term effect. Furthermore, if a “balloon effect” does occur, forced eradication
results in a significant “unintended” environmental damage as more old native
forest is destroyed to plant new illegal crops and in some cases, large migrations
to other rural and urban areas where uprooted peasants settle. Forced
eradication also has the “unintended” effect of weakening community loyalty
to the state, and the displacement of peasants might increase the willingness
of young people to join armed groups like FARC. Both of these are obstacles
to achieve a long-term solution.
V. The Evolution of Anti-Drug Policies in the
Andean Countries
Anti drug policies in the Andean countries have evolved in time and space.
Drug policy changes have responded to the development and evolution of
the illegal industry, the experience of past policies and the countries’
international relations, among other factors.  Anti drug policies in the Andean
countries are prohibitionist. Many argue that they have been imposed by the
United States, but any detailed study shows a complex process full of nuances
(Guáqueta, 2004). For over 400 years policies toward mind-altering drugs in
the Andes were a domestic policy issue. Andean prohibitionist policies toward
coca and chicha (a corn based fermented beverage) antecede by several
centuries the international prohibitionist policies promoted by the United States
and other countries.17
17 See for example Llano and Campuzano’s (1994) history of chicha in Colombia.
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a. Traditional Coca and Policies
Coca use was widespread in the Andean region before the Spanish
Conquest. It is not clear, however, whether it was generalized in the population
or limited to the elite. During the Colony, coca was used to help exploit large
mines (mainly silver) and haciendas but several groups opposed those
practices mainly to protect the Indian population. Coca was used in religious
ceremonies and many social occasions. Despite its common use, coca
cultivation presented some serious problems. Coca grows in areas with
endemic tropical illnesses that resulted in very high mortality rates. For
example, coca workers used to supply the Potosí mines suffered an annual
mortality rate of about 30% which led to the establishment of the mita, a
forced labor system (Gagliano, 1994: ch. 2)
Until well into the XX Century coca was used as a food substitute in
mining and farming. Coca does have many minerals and vitamins but they
are unlikely to have compensated a deficient diet among peasants and miners.
During the XIX and the first half of the XX Centuries coca chewing was the
subject of political debate. Lobbyists for the landed aristocracy in Peru
supported traditional coca uses but a progressive group that aimed to improve
the Indians’ standard of living opposed those uses. They had two main
arguments: that coca allowed the government not to worry about the Indians’
nutrition levels, and that coca use was an obstacle to incorporate the Indian
communities into the Peruvian mainstream (Gagliano, 1994, ch. 6 and 7,
Gootenberg, 1999). These progressive groups sought to industrialize coca,
which meant to produce cocaine to compete with American and European
pharmaceutical laboratories. This group, however, was opposed to the
traditional coca uses by the Indian communities (Gootenberg, 1999).
Traditional coca chewing was a topic of debate during most of the XX
Century. Important groups of the Bolivian and Peruvian elite opposed coca
chewing and had no problem signing the 1961 Single Convention of the
United Nations in which they agreed to eliminate coca chewing within 25
years after the convention was ratified. They also signed and the subsequent
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Drugs and 1988 Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances although the Bolivian
government signed the 1988 Convention with reserves (see below). As noted,
coca was included in Schedule 1 that limits coca to medical or scientific
research uses only. Therefore, it precludes any traditional coca use.
 The status of coca in the UN Conventions has been a torn in the foot of
the Bolivian and Peruvian Indian communities. They continuously complain
that “coca is not cocaine”; that classifying coca, a nature given plant that
has been used for millennia in the Andes without significant negative effects
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on users, as a psychotropic drug is unfair. They argue that coca has many
uses in the Indian cultures particularly in religious ceremonies, that coca is
sacred and that the 1961 convention requirement that Bolivia and Peru
eradicate coca from earth within 25 years placed an unreasonable restriction
on the religious freedom of Indian communities (Rivera-Cusicanqui, 2003).
The confusing status of coca in the UN Conventions has allowed some
policy makers to advocate the total eradication of coca from earth, exacerbating
the Indian communities’ distrust. For example, Pino Arlacchi, the Undersecretary
General of the United Nations in charge of the drug control program
unsuccessfully proposed in the 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special
Session to set the goal of total coca and poppy eradication by 2008.
The Bolivian and Peruvian governments have created agencies to con-
trol and regulate legal coca markets, including the small coca exports to
Coca-Cola.18  These agencies have not had, however, the needed budgets
and managerial resources to control licit markets of coca or to prevent
leakages of legally produced coca to illicit markets.
Colombian Indian communities are a much smaller proportion of the
country’s population than in Bolivia and Peru and were, and are, weaker
and less organized than their counterparts in other Andean countries. Most
were quickly assimilated into mainstream society during the Colony. Coca
use was not widespread and by the 1940s it was limited to small areas were
some Indian communities had survived. In contrast with Peru and Bolivia,
Colombia did not export coca or developed a system to control the coca
market. In the late 1940s the government had a strong campaign led by
Public Health Minister Jorge Bejarano against chicha and coca. A main
achievement of this campaign was the prohibition to pay part of a peon’s
salary in coca leaves, which was a tradition in some haciendas in Cauca
Department (Thoumi, 1995). Despite this campaign, coca policy was never
a significant policy issue, which it was in Bolivia and Peru.
b. Policy Response to the Development
of the Illegal Cocaine Industry
Coca regulation in the Andean countries was a domestic policy issue
until about 1970 when the illegal world cocaine market began to grow and
coca and cocaine control became a main international relations issue involving
foreign actors and substantial new policies were formulated. These evolved
differently in Colombia as contrasted with Bolivia and Peru, reflecting the
differences in the development of the illegal industry in those countries.
18 These ended in 2000 when Cola-Cola started to use a synthetic substitute.
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From the early 1970s to the mid to late 1990s the main Colombian policy
problem was to confront drug trafficking. In Bolivia and Peru the main issue
was how to deal with illegal crops and the peasantry involved in those activities.
Large Colombian criminal organizations (“cartels”) concentrated cocaine
manufacturing and international trafficking and accumulated large fortunes.
The growth of the illegal industry in Colombia has been associated with a lot
more violence and the illegal income was a lot more concentrated than in
Bolivia and Peru.
Any illegal industry requires a social support network to operate. The
drug industry in poor countries needs strong links with the political establish-
ment and it is a key source of corruption. In the 1980s Peruvian guerrillas
provided protection to the industry and obtained substantial funds from it. In
Colombia both left and right wing guerrilla groups have profited from the
illegal trade during the last 20 years and are today their main source of
support. The links between guerrillas and drug trafficking have undermined
the political agendas of subversive and counter subversive guerrilla groups
and have also placed the armed forces at risk of corruption.
Anti-drug policies include a complex set of measures to attack various aspects
of the illegal industry. In Bolivia and Peru alternative development (AD) programs
have played a dominant role. These have been funded by international cooperation,
mainly USAID and the United Nations. Other international donors, especially
the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), have also contributed.
AD is an interesting case of attempting to learn by doing. These programs
started as crop-substitution projects that sough other crops that could grow
in coca producing areas. These proved to be insufficient to induce peasants
to eliminate illegal crops. Programs then evolved into more complex ones
that sought comprehensive development including infrastructure, public
services, education, health, and other public services and community
development. To complement these projects, AD programs have also included
employment generation projects in regions that supplied migrants to coca
growing areas. AD in Colombia played a secondary role until recently.19
 The AD experience around the world indicates that these programs
tend to displace illegal crops to other regions or countries. This effect has
been discounted in practice and has not prevented the funding of new AD
programs that in the best-case scenario, from a particular country’s point of
view, successful programs tend to displace crops to a different country
(Renard, 2001, Clawson and Lee, 1993, Thoumi, 2003a).20
19 The literature on AD is extensive. See Lee and Clawson (1993), Cabieses and Musso (1999),
Vargas-Meza (2003), Renard (2001), Thoumi (2003a: ch. 11).
20 This has been clearly the case in apparently successful AD cases in Thailand where poppy
field moved to Myanmar and in Pakistan where they moved to Afghanistan.
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Among the anti-drug policy arsenal in the Andean countries AD is the main
and frequently the only carrot. All other policies aim to punish the illegal
industry actors. These include: forced and “voluntary” eradication (this can
be manual or through aerial spraying which is allowed only in Colombia);
search and seizure of illegal laboratories and places where drugs are stored;
interdiction, confiscation and destruction of illegal drugs and the chemical
inputs used in their production; capturing and jailing industry actors and
extraditing them to the United States; and confiscation and expropriation of
assets accumulated by the illegal industry. Other possible carrots are programs
to strengthen government institutions and agencies such as the police and
the justice system.
These policies involve a broad range of institutions and individuals including
the private sector. Cooperation is required from the financial sector, real
estate companies, chemical products’ manufacturers, importers and traders,
lawyers, financial advisers, chemists, and in general, from anyone who has
a contact with the illegal industry or the funds it generates. In the public
sector it is necessary to coordinate the activities of myriads of agencies:
security and intelligence forces; the judicial system; the armed forces and
the police; the legislative branch and many ministries such as defense,
agriculture, environment, etc.
Anti drug policies have had many difficulties and problems. First, they
have been formulated within the context of a “war on drugs” mentality in
which any weapon is good to fight an evil foe. This policy approach has not
taken into account some complex contradictory policy effects. A case in
point is aerial spraying in areas where AD projects are implemented. Aerial
spraying, at times, has not been very accurate. In Colombia planes have had
to spray from relatively high altitudes to avoid guerrilla fire. Shifting winds
can spray herbicides over large areas beyond the illegal planting fields. Crop
eradication increases coca and opium prices and generates incentives to
establish new plantings in other regions. A further example is provided by
the enforcement of the extradition treaty between Colombia and the United
States in the mid-1980s that resulted in a narco-terrorist wave that weakened
the state’s ability to implement other policies.
Second, policy success requires a high degree of coordination among all
state agencies involved that is likely to be beyond the capacity of the Andean
countries. It is necessary, for example, to coordinate the actions of, among
others, the army, the police, the judicial sector, security and intelligence agen-
cies, the agriculture ministry, etc. In a few cases, the lack of coordination
among the army, police and intelligence agencies in Colombia has resulted in
confrontations among them that produced “friendly fire” victims.
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Third, anti-drug policies have not been formulated as a result of broad based
national policy consensuses. In fact, many of the actors whose support is required
to achieve success have not participated in the policy formulation processes and
are neither convinced of the policies’ convenience or effectiveness nor committed
to their success. Not surprisingly, the implementation of many of these policies
has been a source of corruption.
Fourth, the “war on drugs” context behind the policy formulation process
implies that anti drug policies must be of the highest priority in the Andean
countries. For many government actors anti-drug policies have had a low
priority. Indeed, when a country has a myriad problems relating to poverty,
inequality, guerrillas, economic crises, etc. anti-drug policies might not seem
to be too pressing and their implementation becomes lax. This was the case
of Colombia during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Fifth, anti-drug policies cannot be evaluated using common cost-benefit
methodologies developed by economics and other social sciences. This seems
a contradiction, but from the perspective of the “war on drugs” it is not
because every anti-drug policy is just a weapon whose effects contribute to
the war effort. If a policy has some negative effects, they are not attributed
to the policy itself but to what is causing the war, that is, to the existence of
illegal drugs. Some policy effects might be undesirable and unfair but they
are just “collateral damage” justified given the imperative to fight a great
evil. Therefore, the benefits generated by the policies are always larger than
their costs and traditional evaluation methods that can be used to choose the
least costly and effective policy simply cannot be contemplated because the evil
of drugs has to be fought with all weapons available. Within a “war on drugs”
mentality policy evaluations can be used to improve the policy efficiency to
attack drugs, not to question the use of the weapon itself or the war strategy.
This is why current policy supporters argue that “there is no silver bullet”
but policies would succeed if they are all applied simultaneously.
Commonly used policy success indicators reflect the impossibility to
evaluate anti-drug policies. Indicators such as the number of sprayed hectares,
the number of trafficking planes neutralized, the weight of seized drugs, the
number of seized and destroyed laboratories, the number of extradited
traffickers, and the like are the most commonly used indicators of policy
success. These are similar to the number of dead and captured enemies in a
war, but they provide little information about the policy effect on prices,
purity and availability in illegal drug markets or about the policies’ effect on
long and medium-term drug supply and demand.
The impossibility to evaluate policies is a reflection of their moral
foundation, and has a corollary in the impossibility to debate them with
some of the main policy critics who use closed thinking models, that
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provide predetermined answers that explain illegal drug phenomena.
These critics reject all empirical evidence that contradicts their models.
The following two examples illustrate this point. Commenting on the
softening of policies toward drug possession in the United States in the
mid 1970s, Escohotado (1999: 136) asserts that this policy change is
explained by the development of the “sin semilla” marijuana variety that
was cultivated hydro phonically and generated large profits in the United
States. This author’s point is quite simple, as long as most marijuana
was imported, possession laws were very tough but when a new variety
developed a successful import-substitution industry, the laws changed to
protect the new industry. This argument is “obvious” to many who
“know” that drugs increase the United States GNP and wealth because
otherwise, why would the United States prohibit drugs?
De Rementería (2001: 16) justifies the development of illicit crops in
the Amazon jungle as “a rational response to the agricultural and rural
crisis (in the Andean countries) caused by developed countries’ protectionist
agricultural policies that result in product prices below real production
costs.” Without defending American and European agricultural subsidies,
it is important to highlight at least a few points that are dismissed by the
author in question: 1. Agricultural subsidies in developed countries have
existed for a very long time and are not statistically related to the expansion
on illicit crops in the Andes. 2. Illicit crops in Colombia are located in
places that are very distant from national markets and are difficult to access.
This is a rational choice of illegal planters to avoid detection and make law
enforcement difficult. Any licit agricultural product from those regions
would have very high transportation costs to any domestic market. 3. The
development of illegal plantings is related, among other factors, to weak
state presence, violence generated peasant displacements, land concen-
tration by drug traffickers (that is, the development of the illegal cocaine
industry itself contributed indirectly to coca expansion), and crisis in other
industries. 4. The collapse in international coffee prices was due to the
large expansion of the crop in Vietnam and was a main cause of peasant
migration from traditional coffee growing regions to the coca and poppy
growing areas in Colombia.
 These two examples show that the complexity of the drug phenomena
and that the empirical evidence is dismissed by authors who appeal to an
“explanation” that is consistent with a model developed following a particu-
lar ideology. In these cases policies cannot be evaluated either because the
closed model already has evaluated them.
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c. Policy Evolution During the 1990s.
During the 1990s the Andean illegal drug industry and the policies against
it changed substantially. The old Medellín and Cali “cartels” were dismantled
in Colombia and their leaders were killed or jailed. Some of them continued
doing business from jail but they lost market share. The industry became
fragmented and a large number of new “cartelitos” that deal in smaller
quantities appeared. At the same time, Colombian traffickers lost market
share in the United States to Mexican organizations that displaced them.
Mexicans started as collaborators that smuggled the Colombians’ cocaine
into the United States but they developed their own distribution networks
and Mexican “cartels” control today the West Coast cocaine market in the
United States and they are large players in the illegal industry. Today a
significant share of Colombian cocaine exports is sold in Mexico at signi-
ficantly lower prices than in the United States.
The illegal industry’s fragmentation generated incentives to grow coca
to avoid the large costs and risks faced by small trafficking organizations in
purchasing trips to Bolivia and Peru. Fragmentation also resulted in incentives
to grow poppy and heroin whose price per kilo is much higher than cocaine’s
and in the establishment of small cells in the United States and Europe to sell
drugs in smaller amounts at much higher prices..
One of the most dramatic changes in the illegal industry during the 1990s
was the change in the geographical location of the illegal plantings. The US
Department of State (2003: II) estimates that in 1990 Peru had 121,300 coca
hectares, Bolivia 50,300 and Colombia 40,100. In 2000 there were 136,200
hectares in Colombia, 34,200 in Peru and 14,600 in Bolivia. These data include
legal coca in Bolivia and Peru, approximately 12,000 hectares in each country.
According to this source, Colombia had about 40,000 hectares until 1993. By
1995 this figure increased to 50,900 and grew substantially in the following
three years to over 100,000 in 1998. Coca plantings in Peru remained at high
levels until 1995 (115,600 hectares), declining to 94,400 in 1997 and 68,800 in
1998. This trend became accentuated and the number of coca hectares declined
to 34,200 in 2000. Coca plantings in Bolivia were relatively stable between
1990 and 1997 fluctuating between 50,000 and 45,500 hectares. From 1998 on
this figure dropped dramatically to 14,600 in 2000.
The sharp drop in coca plantings in Bolivia and Peru is generally attributed
to those countries repressive policies. The Peruvian success is attributed to
the “Air bridge denial strategy” that neutralized trafficking airplanes.21
21 Ronken, Ledebur and Kruse (1999) describe in detail this policy without sharing the view of
its success.
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According to a power point presentation made by the Peruvian delegation
to the Commission of Narcotic Drugs in Vienna in 2003, the “air interdiction
program began in 1992 but was interrupted in 1993 and it was reinstated
only in late 1994 with full support of radar platforms (AWACS and P-3
Orion)”. Furthermore, “in only 6 months the program blocked air traffic
from the Colombian (cocaine) producing zones” and “this was the main
transportation means to send coca base to Colombia where it was transformed
into cocaine. When this route was cut, the drug trafficking industry decided
for this and other reasons, to promote coca plantings in Colombia. This reduced
the coca demand and coca prices in Peru.”
 This is a nice policy success story. However, when one looks at all
available data in more detail, a different picture appears. First, the evidence
about illegal coca growth in Colombia provided by independent researchers
shows that coca plantings began to grow substantially before 1995. Uribe
(1997: 88) shows that by early 1995 Colombia already had about 80,000
coca hectares. This shows that the fragmentation of the Colombian “cartels,”
that started with the government’s fight against the Medellín cartel in 1989,
and the growth in the Colombian coca supply played an important role in the
Peruvian coca crop decline. Furthermore, according to official Peruvian air
force data, they began to neutralize planes in 1990.22  These data show
three planes neutralized in 1990, eleven in 1991 and 1992, twenty-five in
1993, fifteen in 1994 and twenty in 1995. These figures dropped substantially
in the following years: three in 1996, 10 in 1997, zero in 1998 and 1999, two in
2000 and one 2001. According to these figures, the attack on air traffic does
not appear to have had a significant effect on drug production and trafficking.
In fact, coca plantings did not decline between 1991 and 1995 when most
planes were neutralized.
United Nations data show that coca prices in the Upper Huallaga Valley
(in constant 2000 dollars) were very low in late 1989 ($0.92 per kilogram)
when the Colombian government’s war against narco-terrorism was at its
highest point. These prices increased in the following year and remained
between $2 and $3 per kilogram until 1995 when they fell again to $1.24
(UN-ODCCP, 2001: 73). Coca prices bottomed out in 1996 ($0.66 per kilo)
and 1997 (0.77 per kilo) and recovered quickly during the following years to
levels comparable to the highest ones of the 1990s, reaching $2,70 per kilo in
2000 (Ibidem).
22 These data were obtained directly by the author from the Peruvian Air Force in December
2002. The Peruvian Air Force has four categories of neutralized airplanes: those who are
seized in land, those that are shot down in the air, those that are destroyed in land and those
self-destroyed by traffickers.
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These production and prices data are consistent with interpretations
provided by Rospigliosi (2000) and Dammert Ego-Aguirre (2000) who have
documented presidential adviser Vladimiro Montesinos’ participation and control
of drug trafficking networks in Peru in the 1990s. Traffickers who paid “tolls”
succeeded and those who did not were shot down. Besides, some planes
could have been neutralized to show the governments’ commitment to the
“war on drugs”. In any case the plane neutralization policy did not have any
effect on coca production or prices between 1990 and 1995.
 Coca cultivation in Bolivia remained stable during the 1990s until 1998
when the newly elected government of General Banzer, promoted a campaign
led by the committed vice-president Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga who instituted an
aggressive manual coca eradication program. This policy broke a tradition of
negotiations with peasant unions (“sindicatos”). In theory, forced eradication
was to be accompanied by substantial AD programs. Quiroga’s policy was
very successful as it achieved an unprecedented decline in coca plantings but
as will be seen below, its long-term sustainability is highly questionable.
The expansion of the Colombian coca plantings was not the result of
Bolivian and Peruvian policies. As noted, small “cartels” have strong
incentives to purchase coca paste and cocaine base locally. Besides other
factors like the left wing guerrillas’ need of funds after the loss of Soviet and
Cuban subsidies after the collapse of socialist economies and the development
of paramilitary groups that also needed funds contributed to the fast coca
plantings expansion.
By the end of the 1990s the Colombian illegal drugs industry had
experienced remarkable changes. The Colombian traffickers had lost a
significant part of their market share in the United States. Drug trafficking
had a lot more actors: a large number of small trafficking organizations
were operating and the illegal industry was closely linked with guerrilla and
paramilitary groups. Besides, heroin exports had been developed and new
markets for cocaine had been opened in Europe, the former Soviet Union
and South America. Today Brazil is the second largest cocaine market
measured by consumption volume. The Colombian illegal industry experienced
an important vertical integration process and by the end of the 1990s its
plant based inputs were almost all domestically grown.
The Bolivian and Peruvian illegal industries also experienced important
changes. In both countries cocaine manufacturing grew and local traffickers
developed links with Mexican “cartels” bypassing Colombian trafficking
organizations. Their illegal industries also became more vertically integrated
despite the great decrease in coca production.
The sharp decline in coca plantings in Bolivia and Peru did not lower cocaine
availability or increased retail prices in the United States and Europe. Official
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United States government data show that during the 1990s coca plantings in the
Andean countries declined from 211,800 hectares in 1990 to 185,000 in 2000
(United States Department of State, 2003:II-16 y 17).  During this period
there was however, a significant technological change and coca field
productivity increased substantially. The same source indicates that in 1990
there was a potential coca leave output of 330,000 tons, a figure that increased
to 664,000 tons in 2000 (United States Department of State, 2003:II-17 y 18).
d. Recent Industry and Policy Evolution
During the first years of the XXI Century the illegal industry and the
policies against it continued evolving. These changes reflect the deep
differences and lack of consensus about drug policies among and within the
Andean countries as well as the policies’ ineffectiveness and changes in the
international environment after September 11, 2001 that produced stronger
external pressures on the Andean countries and a commitment by the United
States to fight terrorism.
 All Andean countries have severe unresolved internal conflicts and have
social groups that feel exploited and excluded from power. Some argue that
the use of coca in Indian communities in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru is a
symbol of cultural identity and resistance to a foreign invader (Vidart, 1991:
1). The large uninhabited areas allows the persistence of a conqueror’s
mentality to the point that the “conquest of the ‘other’ has not been
completed” (De Roux, 1990: 11).
As noted, during centuries coca policy in the Andes was a domestic issue
but the development of the illegal industry has internationalized the issue and
through it, the domestic social conflicts. The involvement of subversive and
counter-subversive groups in the illegal market and the developments after
the September 11 events that led to those groups being declared terrorists
by the American and many European governments have reinforced repressive
anti-drug policies.
1. The Developments in Colombia
The Pastrana administration (1998-2002) in collaboration with the United
States government formulated “Plan Colombia” that originally included funds
to implement a series of policies against drugs. The United States government
restricted the use of those funds to fighting drugs, preventing their use against
subversive and counter-subversive organizations. This plan included traditional
policies like AD, programs to strengthen the justice system, the technical
level of anti-money laundering state agencies, the police and the armed forces.
The most controversial policy funded by “Plan Colombia” is aerial spraying
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of coca and poppy fields. This policy is illegal in the other Andean countries
where it has not been implemented. The widespread use of aerial spraying
reflects the Colombian state’s inability to control its territory and to develop
a manual eradication program, and the “war on drugs” mentality behind
anti-drug policies that tolerates any action irrespective of its possible social
and environmental costs. This attitude was reinforced with the formulation
of “Plan Patriota” under the Uribe administration to expand the territorial
control of the state and fight guerrillas and paramilitary organizations. Indeed,
the Colombian government discourse asserts that aerial spraying is an
effective policy against narco-terrorist groups that have absolutely no
legitimate grievance. One of the main driving forces behind this policy is the
need “to cut the funding of the guerrillas and paramilitary groups that have
caused extraordinary damage to society” (Restrepo, 2004).
 Aerial spraying has been considered a great success by the American
and Colombian governments. They estimate that it resulted in a decline of
coca plantings of 25% in 2003. After the United States government classified
guerrilla and paramilitary groups as terrorists “Plan Colombia” funds could
be used to fight them. Aerial spraying is a blunt weapon that frequently
destroys legal crops and may have negative health and environmental effects.
The implementation of this policy in Colombia presents several unsolved
issues. First, because of the on going armed conflict, the herbicide used
(glyphosate widely used and known commercially mainly as roundup) cannot
be applied following the manufacturer’s recommendation. Since the herbicide
is formulated to be sprayed from very short distances, its use in aerial spraying
requires the addition of a “fixer” that adds unknown health and environmental
effects (Sherret, 2005). Frequent reports also indicate that the concentration
of glyphosate used is substantially higher than the one recommended by the
US Environmental Protection Agency, although this fact cannot be
corroborated, it would not be surprising given the “war on drugs” and anti-
terrorism mentality that has influenced anti-drug policies in Colombia.
Second, many reports claim that aerial spraying has destroyed other crops,
that the herbicide has been blown by winds into Ecuador, and that it has had
significant negative effects on fauna and human health. In Colombia there
has been a debate over the health impact of aerial spraying. The people’s
ombudsman’s office and several NGOs have produced several reports
presenting evidence of those effects. The American government in turn
financed a study by a well-known Colombian toxicologist that used the clinic
histories of 21 patients who claimed to have been impacted by aerial spraying.
Unfortunately, the doctor who collected these data could not be located.
This study showed that none of the claims was valid because the patients
were infected but not intoxicated and was used to reject the many claims of
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several thousand peasants, of the Ecuadorian government, NGOs and the
people’s ombudsman.23 The critics of this policy and the governments’
responses have focused on the effects on peasant health (Revelo-Calderón,
2001, Defensoría del Pueblo, 2002). Unfortunately, the debate about aerial
spraying has focused only on direct health effects which, as the Colombian
government asserts, are likely to be minor and less important than those
generated by the peasants’ misuse of many other chemicals, defoliants and
herbicides.24 Other important effects such as the displacement of people
and plantings and the loss of fauna and flora could be more important but
have not received any significant attention.
Third, aerial spraying is likely to have strong short-term results but it is
also likely to conflict with long-term solutions to the drug issue. Two of the
strongest feelings expressed by the citizenry in coca and poppy growing
regions are their abandonment by the central state and their lack of loyalty
to it. State presence by aerial spraying is not conducive to building the loyalty to
the state and the identity feelings as a member of the broad Colombian
society required to achieve long-term success against illegal drugs.
Fourth, spraying has brought new actors to the Colombian conflict. These
include border Ecuadorian communities and that country’s government,
several international businesses that provide services and materials to spray,
and NGOs interested in the environment. This policy increases the degree
of internationalization and complexity of the Colombian conflict.
Fifth, aerial spraying appears to be loosing its edge as an eradication
policy. Sources close to the Colombian and American agencies involved in
aerial spraying and recent journalist reports indicate that there are several
coca varieties that have developed resistance to glyphosate. This could be
the result of a natural reaction or research done by the illegal industry. These
sources also indicate that there are talks about substituting more toxic
herbicides which no doubt, will have greater health and environmental effects.
Indeed, in 2003 there was a decline of 15,000 hectares of illicit crops. The
number of sprayed hectares was however, much larger, somewhere around
120,000 resulting in a cost per eradicated hectare of about $8,000. These
are quite high compared with those of possible AD programs highlighting
the inefficiency of aerial spraying as an eradication tool (Vargas, 2004).
Expropriation of traffickers’ assets has been one of the anti-drug policies’
weaknesses in Colombia. Properties were seized but the expropriation process
23 It is possible, however, that infections arise as secondary effects of aerial spraying. It is
acknowledged that spraying causes minor rashes and people scratches can result in infections.
24 Vice-president Francisco Santos, for example, made this claim at the seminar “La Política de
Desarrollo Alternativo y su Modelo Institucional” at the Universidad de Los Andes on
September 8, 2004.
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was extremely cumbersome, lengthy and rarely succeeded. The increased
awareness about the participation of the main actors of the armed conflict in
the illegal drug industry was a great incentive to change the laws to facilitate
expropriations. This was achieved with a new law in 2002. It is remarkable
that finally in 2003 the state succeeded expropriating many buildings and
land of Gonzalo Rodríguez-Gacha, a Medellín “cartel” member killed more
that 12 years earlier. This development opens up the possibility to promote a
land reform program distributing expropriated lands.
Extradition to the United States has been a policy used in a remarkably
liberal fashion by the Uribe administration. In the 18 years before Uribe
took office in August 2002 Colombia had extradited less than a 100 traffickers.
In the first two years of his administration Uribe extradited more than 170
including some of his youth buddies.  Extradition is a strong punitive policy
and according to its supporters, highly dissuasive even though there is no
real knowledge about the magnitude of this effect. Today the Colombian
government is facing an interesting dilemma: it is trying to develop peace
negotiations with paramilitary groups but the United States government has
requested the extradition of several of the main paramilitary leaders. This
has become a key obstacle for any peace process in Colombia. A similar
situation would arise in case of peace negotiations with the main guerrilla
groups. The extradition agreement with the United States has made this
country’s government an integral part of any peace process in Colombia.
The linking of terrorism and the illegal drugs industry by the United States
has led it to harden its position against money and asset laundering. In
collaboration with the Colombian government the United States has made
efforts to control the parallel dollar-peso market and particularly the so called
“peso brokers”. This effort has resulted in significant expropriations of
financial assets, including those of some Colombian entrepreneurs who made
their wealth in legal activities but had purchased parallel market dollars of
questionable origin. This policy is likely to limit the parallel market and indu-
ce Colombian capitalists to increase the use of the official market.
The complexity of anti-drug policies has increased substantially and they
now require greater coordination among government actors in charge of
policy formulation and implementation. Aerial spraying, for example, requires
close coordination with AD programs to provide licit options to sprayed
peasants and to avoid spraying licit AD crops. Policy coordination is today
more difficult than in the past because policies are more complex, they involve
more actors with very diverse interests, including foreign public and private
organizations. Unfortunately, policy coordination is a weak link in the drug policy
chain. Different institutions have different goals and there are frequent turf
wars among them. The army and police, for example, fight to take some anti-
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drug actions and at times to “recycle” illegally seized drugs. In some incidents
army and police units have battled each other to control a batch of seized cocaine.
Despite the apparent success against illicit crops, there are reports that
indicate that coca and poppy fields have become common in other rural
areas of the country. Most new plantings are small and easy to hide. It
appears that coca now grows mixed with other crops in the old coffee growing
regions and that a coca variety that grows in the shade and is harder to
detect has been developed. Mr. Walters, the head of the US Office of Drug
Control and Crime Prevention (ONDCP) is however quite optimistic about
developments in Colombia even though retail cocaine prices did not increase
but actually declined somewhat in the United States in 2004 while retail
market purity remained about the same.  The official ONDCP explanation
is that drug traffickers are selling stocks they kept in case of shortages and
that retail cocaine prices will rise soon.25
The ONDCP explanation might seem plausible to many, but it is highly
questionable. At issue is whether drug traffickers keep large stocks of cocaine
or heroin. Illegal industries have very strong incentives not to keep stocks
that can be seized and destroyed by law enforcement agencies or competing
traffickers. Indeed, their practices are similar to “just in time” practices in
the legal sector. It can be argued that after the 1999 and 2000 bumper poppy
crops in Afghanistan, the Taliban that controlled the country, allowed
traffickers to kept large opium and heroin stocks to prevent prices from
falling and banned poppy plantings but not opium and heroin trafficking.
There is no question that when there is a symbiotic relationship between the
state and trafficking organizations, these can have an inventory policy
designed to keep prices high and speculate keeping stocks. It is difficult
however, to find a reason for traffickers in the United States or Colombia to
keep large stocks. In the near future it will be clarified whether aerial spraying
has really had an effect on cocaine availability and purity in the main
international markets.
25 In the middle of August 2004 reports about cocaine prices and the success of eradication were
conflictive. ONDCP director John Walters in an State Department file (http//usinfo.state.gov/
xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&02004) expressed great optimism, indicated that
cocaine prices had risen somewhat in some European markets and that he had intelligence that
allowed him to forecast rising prices and lower cocaine purity in the United States markets within
the next twelve months. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign-policy
studies at the Cato Institute in a National Review comment (http//www.nationalreview.com/
comment/carpenter200408120826.asp) interpreted Mr. Walters’ claims as more of the same
old news that promises success just around the corner and argues that coca crops are growing
fast in Bolivia and Peru and that productivity has increased, eliminating the possibility of a
retail cocaine price increase in the United States markets.
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2. The Peruvian Case
The political and institutional infrastructure required to formulate and
implement policies in Peru during the last two decades has been severely
weakened. After the catastrophic populist government of Alan García, the
Fujimori administration stabilized the economy but its response to the existing
political crisis did not aim to develop stable democratic institutions. Fujimori
implicitly accepted the position of a group of the military that asserted that
Peru was not ready for a democratic system and that the system based on the
country’s traditional parties had been responsible for the deep crisis of the late
1980s. Supported by the military forces, Fujimori established a government
that can be characterized as a civil dictatorship that attempted to perpetuate
itself backed by the military. To achieve this goal it used several types of
cooptation and corruption for which the control of the illegal drug industry
was instrumental.
The greatest challenge faced by the current Toledo administration is the
construction and reconstruction of democratic institutions some of which
had been destroyed during the previous regime and others that had never
developed. The nature of anti drug policies and foreign technical assistance
play a key role in this process and can either promote or compromise the
country’s response to the challenge it faces.
At the start of his government, President Toledo made an effort to achieve
a national consensus about state policies; that is, a set of broadly accepted
policies that could transcend a particular administration and have long-term
continuity. A policy document signed by all political parties was agreed on by
July 2002. It includes twenty-nine policies grouped in four categories. The
twenty-seventh policy refers to “eradication of illegal drugs’ production, traffic
and consumption” and asserts “our commitment to adopt an integral anti-
drug policy based on ethical and social values. It will have educational,
economic, commercial, punitive, and public health control mechanisms. We
also commit ourselves to generate and support efficient alternative develop-
ment programs to produce profitable goods including those coca leaf based;
and interdiction systems to eliminate illegal drug traffic and campaigns
designed to eliminate drug consumption. We will also take care of the needs
of the populations most affected by drug trafficking and of the health of
those affected by drug consumption”.
This was a broad general declaration of principles that could be signed
by all political parties. Unfortunately, it has not allowed the formulation and
implementation of a state anti-drug policy. To begin with, this policy conflicts
with other state policies. The eighth policy for example, seeks to achieve
“political, economic and administrative decentralization to promote an inte-
gral, harmonic and sustained development.” The government has encouraged
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decentralization of many activities to increase regional autonomy. In the
Peruvian context this has become an obstacle to a coherent anti-drug state
policy because regional and local governments tend to have policies that
conflict with those of the central government particularly in regions where
coca growers are the basis of the electorate.
 The government has tried to formulate a coca law to regulate and control
licit coca production but has failed to achieve a consensus about it.26  During
the last few years coca growers have frequently mobilized demanding the
legalization of all coca plantings and the industrialization of coca. A group of
“cocalogos” provides advice to peasant organizations and argues that coca
cannot be industrialized as long as it is in the United Nations Single Convention
Schedule 1. A few experiments in the past have indicated that coca might
have several licit uses. This include coca toothpaste, chiclets, some liquors,
and as a cellulose source in paper making. They also argue that coca chewing
could be improved if coca is made into pellets mixed with other ingredients
that would facilitate the extraction of cocaine and other alcaloids without using
lime. Coca tea could also be improved using high quality coca to develop a
“coca gourmet” market. All these possible uses would develop market niches
that their supporters expect could result in better coca prices. Unfortunately,
there are no real market studies or estimates of possible coca requirements to
determine the relevance of these hypothetical coca uses. The development of
these possible alternative coca uses could be encouraged, but that will not
contribute significantly to “solve” the “coca problem”. First, any educated
guess about the magnitude of possible legal coca demand indicates that it
might no be very large.27  Furthermore, coca industrialization proponents don’t
seem to realize that legal coca prices would be low relative to those of the
illegal sector. Coca prices are a very small share of retail cocaine prices,
about one-half of one percent in the case of American street prices. If needed,
traffickers may easily increase coca prices several fold to compete with any
legal coca industry demand, without significantly affecting profits. In fact,
only if coca is used to produce illegal cocaine it can have “just and fair” prices
desired by peasants and their supporters.
26 As of September 2004 there were nine different coca law projects drafted by various groups
in Congress. The government was also working on its own project. The prospect for any law
to be approved in the next few months does not appear to be good.
27 Cabieses (1996) explores several possible coca uses and concludes that even though coca
could have many uses, the total possible demand would be small. Furthermore, interviews of
this author with two former ENACO managers in Lima in December 2002 produced “back-
of-the-envelop” estimates of 40 hectares for all the coca used to satisfy the demand for coca
tea in Peru. There are reports that USAID is developing an estimate of the coca requirements
for chewing and other licit uses but the report is not yet available although researchers close
to USAID-Lima guess that the total figure would be under 9,000 hectares.
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During several centuries, until 1961, coca production was legal. Its
traditional consumption was widespread in some regions, so much so that it
was even included in some lists of needed staples subjected to price controls.
Despite coca being well known and used, its only significant industrial use
was as an input to produce cocaine. This is a good indication that most likely,
there are no real good industrial uses of coca unless some dramatic
technological change takes place. Besides, the inclusion of coca in the UN
Schedule 1 does not preclude its use once cocaine is extracted from it, as it
is the case with “Coca-cola”. The inclusion in Schedule 1 only means that
coca cultivation has to be controlled and that its uses regulated to make sure
that cocaine does not enter into any possible product. The point is that coca
advocates, “cocalogos” and coca growing peasants want to free coca from
those constraints to be able to sell in a free market without having to answer
for coca sales to drug traffickers.28
During the last year peasant protests and marches have become
increasingly frequent and have become more organized. The government
has detained several coca growers’ leaders and negotiations with peasant
groups have not advanced. In the meantime, coca plantings are increasing
and available reports indicate that they are spreading across the country.
There are also indications of a Shinning Path recovery and possibly links of
that organization with the Colombian FARC. All these developments show
and increasingly complex and unpredictable situation.
3. The Bolivian Case29
As mentioned above, the Banzer administration that took over in August
1997 implemented “Plan Dignidad” committed to eliminate the drug
“scourge” (República de Bolivia, 1998).30  The plan had four main aspects:
coca eradication¸ drug interdiction (mainly laboratory destruction), some anti-
money laundering measures and a program of drug addiction treatment and
prevention. The plan’s implementation had strong support of the American
Government and was concentrated on forced eradication. According to the
American Embassy, the emphasis on eradication was justified because Bo-
livia did not have large trafficking organizations and illegal drugs’ exports
28 Opium poppy is also in schedule 1 and no country has argued that this has been an obstacle to
produce licit medicaments like morphine and codeine. In fact, the United Nations has developed
and oversees a system that assigns legal opium production quotas to several countries.
29 This section uses some material published in Thoumi (2003b).
30 “Plan Dignidad” was the brainchild of Vice-president Quiroga, whose small party was a
member of the coalition that took Banzer to power.
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were made by small family groups.31  The small size of the political and
economic elite and the large illegal drug revenues make Bolivia very vulne-
rable to drug traffickers’ political and economic influence. Besides, it is likely
that Bolivians have gained market share in the world’s illegal cocaine busi-
ness in recent years. First, coca plantings in Bolivia had a large decline in
1998 and coca prices in Peru increased substantially. This suggests that
Bolivian traffickers or criminal organizations with Bolivian participation
substituted Peruvian for Bolivian coca. Furthermore, in mid 1999 Marino
Diodato, an Italian, official of the Bolivian army married to a niece of Gene-
ral Banzer, was indicted on cocaine charges. The indictment also claimed
that Mr. Diodato was part of a large international trafficking network linked
to the Italian Mafia and Camorra.
By 2000 “Plan Dignidad” had achieved a remarkable success that appears
hard to sustain in the long-run. The United States department of State (2004)
reports a sustained increased in coca plantings during the last four years:
14,600 hectares in 2000, 19,900 in 2001, 24,400 in 2002 and 28,450 in 2003.
Journalistic reports also indicate that coca plantings have spread beyond the
traditional growing areas of Chapare and Yungas.
 The forced eradication program caused a substantial decline in peasant
income and spanned a series of protests, some of which have been violent.
Economic crises in Argentina and Brazil, two countries that have been
important markets for products of AD programs, and the sharp drop in coffee
prices caused by large increases in Vietnam’s production, also contributed
to the peasant income fall.
 Forced coca eradication at a time when AD programs were facing deep
problems generated a sharp peasant reaction that gained momentum.
Beginning in April 2000 there were frequent confrontations between the
government and peasant confederations that were demanding an end to the forced
eradication program and other measures against drug trafficking. To end
the protests the government signed a few agreements in which it committed
itself to unrealistic measures. At the same time, coca leaders who were
members of Congress led a strong political opposition to eradication. Support
for the government within Congress was sufficient to get Evo Morales, the
main cocalero leader, expelled from Congress in early 2002. This measure
proved to be very costly for the government as it raised the popular support
for Mr. Morales who became a serious presidential candidate.
The 2002 election was remarkable. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was
elected with only 22% of the votes. Evo Morales was a surprising second
31 Author’s interview with American Ambassador Donna Hrinak in La Paz, April 1999.
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and two other Indian candidates, Felipe Quispe and Felipe Flórez obtained
significant support, exceeding the votes of several traditional parties. These
three Indian candidates controlled 50% of Congress which led Evo Morales
to proclaim that he was going to govern from the streets.
 Coca is not the only issue behind peasant protests. In some regions the
lack of peasant land access is the main grievance. The peasant agenda also
includes other issues such as education, health services and public utilities.
Coca, however, is a catalytic issue for the peasant movement.
Peasants continued protesting, blocking highways and expressing
grievances. These increased the pressure on Sánchez de Lozada who was
forced to stop the forced eradication program in early 2003. He even
considered to allow every peasant family to have a small coca field, a policy
that could not be implemented because of American pressures.
Coca has given power to the Bolivian peasantry for the first time in their
history and they have learned how to use it. New peasant protests developed
in opposition to a possible agreement between the Bolivian and Chilean
governments to build a pipe to export to the United States. These protests
continued in crecendo until Sánchez de Lozada was forced to resign on October
17, 2003. The presidential succession followed the Constitution and vice-
president Carlos D. Mesa took power. In Morales’ (2003: 12) words: “Bolivians
experienced a great revolt. After been humiliated for more than 500 years,
what happened in September and October shows that the reason of the people
has prevailed and has begun to defeat the empire’s gun. For many years we
have lived the confrontation of two cultures! The culture of life represented
by Indian peoples and the culture of death represented by the west.”
Morales continues: “This uprising of the Bolivian people was not just
against gas and hydrocarbons but against a set of grievances: discrimination
and marginalization, but fundamentally against neoliberalism’s exhaustion.
Neoliberalism is responsible for the shedding of the blood and uprising of the
Bolivian people. October 17 is the day of the Bolivian peoples’ dignity. That
day we began to tear down the symbol of neoliberalism represented by
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada; we started to defeat the symbol of corruption
and the political mafia. That day the people reacted timely to say with Sub-
Commander Marcos: ‘it is enough!’ enough of policies of famine and misery.
This October 17 marks for us the beginning of a new building stage in which
we will confront egotism and individualism. From peasant and Indian
communities, from the barrios, we will build other life experiences based on
solidarity and reciprocity and the distribution of wealth concentrated in few
hands. This is the great task that confronts us after the great uprising of this
great Bolivian people”
But there is more: “I want to tell you the dream of the Bolivian leaders,
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our task at this time is to strengthen this anti-imperialist sentiment, to stop
the American aggression against Cuba, against Chávez. We want a great
summit with Fidel, Chávez and Lula to tell them: ‘We are in front of American
imperialistic aggression.’ We want to organize a summit accompanied by
our sister Rigoberta Menchú, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, and other social and
labor union leaders and personalities. A great summit to tell our peoples: we
are joined together to defend humanity. Because we do not have any other
option: to defend humanity we have to defeat the system, we have to defeat
American imperialism.” Evo Morales is today a very strong candidate for
the 2007 Bolivian presidential election.
VI. Challenges and Issues
Related to Specific Policies
a. Alternative Development (AD)
As noted, above, AD is the main carrot in the anti-drug policy arsenal
and started following a simple crop substitution approach whose basic
idea was to find a crop that could be produced by coca and poppy growing
peasants to sustain their families. This proved insufficient and AD projects
have evolved into complex programs that aim to “substitute a legal economy
for an illegal one.”
AD programs and projects face many challenges and obstacles. The
following are among the most important. The first problem is to find a suitable
crop to substitute for coca or poppy. Most, it not all possible crops, are not
indigenous to coca growing regions. These tend to have several adaptation
problems: they exhaust the soil after one or a few crops and they tend to
develop plagues that are hard and costly to control. These crops require
technical assistance, the development of marketing systems and various
types of food processing plants. Different crops require different infrastruc-
ture, technologies and labor skills alien to the peasants.
For AD to succeed it is necessary to incorporate coca and poppy growing
regions into the mainstream economy but successful AD crops face a lot
more competition than coca and poppy. As noted, coca and poppy grow in
very few places while legal crops grow in many regions and countries.
A second, basic problem is that AD projects fight market forces. They
obviously have to compete with profitable illegal crops, but they also must
compete with legal ones. If one wanted to develop a hearts of palm project
in Colombia, for example, one most likely would not choose the coca-growing
region in Putumayo to establish it. In fact, if it weren’t for the existence of
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coca plantings, there would not be funds available for projects in Putumayo.
It must be stressed that AD projects are not in effect development projects
but rather, development counter projects designed to eliminate an existing
profitable but illegal project.
As counter projects, AD projects have specific challenges. First, in any
rural development project it does not matter what is produced or traded. What
matters is the internal rate of return of the project. For example, in an agricultural
project it does not matter if peasants switch products as long as the new
products are profitable; when a highway is build, it does not matter what kind
of goods are carried by the trucks that travel it. In the case of AD, it is important
to make sure that peasants do not switch back to illegal crops and that trucks
do not carry cocaine or chemical products used in refining it.  Second, as a
counter project, AD has to prevent possible migrations to coca and poppy
growing regions of people who would like to engage in those illegal activities.
For this reason, AD projects have included employment-generating programs
in regions from where migrants are likely to move to illicit crop zones. Third,
AD projects do not end as long as there is a threat of illegal crops coming
back. Even if an AD projects succeeds, it is necessary to continue monitoring
that region to make sure that peasants do not go back to cultivating illegal
crops. This is particularly important when AD crops fail or their prices fall.
Fourth, AD programs frequently constitute the main policy intervention in a
country’s rural sector. AD funds are almost always provided by foreign donors
and are free to the government and peasants where illicit crops are located. In
the Andean countries AD has frequently provided the main source of subsidized
funds to the rural sector. In the case of Bolivia, for example, Chapare, the
main coca-growing region has the best infrastructure and public services among
all rural regions of the country, most ot it built with AD funds. This presents a
dilemma for peasants who realize that to get resources from the government
and foreign donors they have to grow illegal crops.
AD programs can succeed locally and have little or no effect on illicit
drug supply as illegal crops tend to migrate to new locations. This “balloon
effect” has been remarkable in some of the most successful AD cases. In
Thailand crops moved to Myanmar (Renard, 2001) and in Pakistan they mo-
ved to Afghanistan. Preventing crop displacement in response to government
intervention is a daunting task that would require strong government presence
and intervention in all possible areas where illicit crops might move.
b. Eradication
Eradication can be voluntary or forced. Voluntary eradication requires
negotiating with coca and poppy growing peasants. This is possible when there
are strong peasant organizations that have the support of their communities.
The causes of illegal drug industry.p65 4/10/2005, 2:17 PM38
The Causes of Illegal Drug Industry Growth in the Andes, Anti-Drug Policies and Their Effectiveness
39
These organizations negotiate with the government and can enforce the
agreements reached. When peasants are not well organized, negotiations on an
individual basis are not likely to produce significant results. In order to negotiate
an eradication program it is also necessary to include incentives for peasants to
eradicate. These can be positive like a compensation for each eradicated hectare
or negative when there is a threat of forced eradication. The governments’
commitment to eradication and their threats of forced eradication have to be
credible. In these cases, voluntary eradication has become “voluntary”.
Forced eradication has been done manually and in exceptional situations
like in Colombia, it has been done through aerial spraying. Manual forced
eradication requires governments to send eradication crews to illicit crop
areas. These include or have to be supported by armed personnel. Peasants
are likely to oppose eradication and conflicts between the government and
peasants are a real possibility. To be effective, the government must have a
well-defined plan about how to respond to peasant reactions before
proceeding with the eradication program; otherwise, the government will
simply react to peasants’ actions increasing the probability of negative
“unintended consequences.”
Aerial spraying is done in Colombia because the government does not
have control over the coca and poppy growing regions and the risks for the
lives of manual crews are simply too great. As noted above, aerial spraying
is a blunt and inaccurate policy that is likely to have other complex effects.
Aerial spraying may be inaccuracy and uncertain. On the one hand, the
sprayed chemicals can be taken by the wind and fall in other locations and
on the other, peasants have devised ways to protect their plants to lower the
effects of spraying.32  These results in very large differences between
spraying and eradication results: one sprayed hectare does not equal one
eradicated hectare in fact, the ratio between the number of eradicated
hectares to the decline in cultivated area in Colombia has been around 10
(Vargas, 2004).
Eradication may be an effective short-run policy. In order to succeed in
the medium and long run it must continue to keep the peasants from growing
illegal crops. It is more effective in the case of coca that is a bush with a
twenty-year productive lifetime than of poppy, a short cycle plant that lasts
about four months. Most poppy growing regions in Colombia can have two
crops a year and peasants can replant after they are sprayed.33
32 The price of molasses in Colombia increased substantially in response to the aerial spraying
program. Peasants apply a liquefied mixture of molasses to their plants for protection when
they expect spraying.
33 This contrasts with the countries in the temperate zones where only one crop a year is
possible.
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The United States government justifies the need for aerial spraying in
Colombia because this country is the main source of cocaine and heroin in
the United States market. There is no question that Colombia is the largest
coca-producing nation in the world and that eliminating a large share of the
Colombian coca crop would have at least a short-term effect on cocaine
availability in the United States. This is not, however, the case for heroin.
Colombia is a marginal heroin world producer (about 4 percent of the world’s
opium crop). Eliminating the Colombian poppy crop would lower heroin supply
in the United States only if the trafficking syndicates could not find alternative
sources or if new traffickers do not fill in the gap left by the small Colombian
crop. In the case of poppy, eradication can be justified as part of the war
against paramilitary and guerrillas in Colombia but the justification as part of
the war on drugs in the United States is highly questionable.
Some of the issues related to aerial spraying were discussed above. One
effect to be added is the peasant displacement it tends to generate because
it destroys not only the illegal crops but also other crops that produce staples
and very frequently the peasants’ livelihood. Because of this, aerial spraying
has caused significant peasant migrations out of coca growing areas in
Putumayo to Colombian cities and other rural regions where they have joined
the cohort of displaced people. It may also argued that aerial spraying is
very like increase the availability and willingness of young peasants to join
armed groups like FARC and the paramilitary.
All eradication policies have the same problems of AD with respect to
crop displacement. They can succeed locally, but that does not guarantee
global success if crops move to other regions.
c. Interdiction
Interdiction takes place at all stages of the drug production and marke-
ting process. This includes laboratory seizures and destruction, interdiction
of inputs (chemical precursors) in drug manufacturing, of drug shipments in
the drug producing countries, while they are transported internationally and
in the mainly consuming countries. Interdiction techniques cover a large
range of technologies, from sniffing dogs to satellite mapping, shutting down
airplanes and sophisticated sensors. Still, effective interdiction must rely on
good intelligence networks.
Interdiction actions produce good photo ops that are frequently displayed
in the media where record seizures make good news about anti-drug policy
success. Yet, to have a significant effect on drug trafficking, interdiction should
seize large percentages of the drugs produced in order to increase costs
sufficiently to discourage traffickers. To achieve this, the level of repression
applied by governments would have to be raised substantially; the interdiction
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budgets and the costs to society would have to increase substantially. For
example, container inspections at ports and border crossings would have to
multiply slowing down international trade and people movement.
Interdiction levels in the past have been socially tolerable. It is likely that
about fifteen to twenty percent of the cocaine produced has been seized.
Empirical studies indicate that at these levels traffickers simply include
interdiction costs as part of their transportation costs, that is, interdiction is
just a normal cost of doing business and has little effect on total supply
beyond a short-term disruption when large shipments are seized (Riley, 1995).
Corruption of those in charge of interdiction is also an issue as seized
drugs may end up back in the market. This means that any interdiction
program also required a good watchdog system to oversee the law enforce-
ment agencies in charge.
d. Extradition
Extradition is a punitive measure that reflects the deep distrust of the
United States on the justice system of the Andean countries. The idea behind
extradition is simple: traffickers have great influence on the Andean societies,
have corrupted their justice systems and have to be extradited in order to be
punished.
An important question regarding extradition is its effectiveness to lower
illicit drug supply. Law enforcers argue that extradition could have an impact
on drug supply because of its deterrent effect, that is, its capacity to dissuade
people from joining trafficking organizations and to induce those in the busi-
ness to drop out. And extradition of “cartel” leaders is a main weapon to
dismantle trafficking organizations.
The deterrent effect of extradition is impossible to estimate but the generally
small number of traffickers extradited before the Uribe administration took
over in Colombia and the proliferation of new trafficking organizations suggest
that it has not been very strong. The effect of extradition on trafficking
organizations is not clear either. Extraditing the leaders of those organizations
could lead to their dismantling if they were organized in a way similar to modern
corporations. This however, is not the case. The drug industry is made of a
conglomerate of independent small organizations many of which provide
services such as transportation and refining to trafficking leaders (Krauthausen
and Sarmiento, 1991). These independents continue to operate when a big
trafficker is captured. The developments in Colombia after the two large
“cartels” were destroyed indicate that jailing leaders might at best have had a
short-term effect on drug supply but that in the medium and long run there
does not appear to have been any significant effect.
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e. Asset Expropriation and
Anti-Money Laundering Measures
These measures are both punitive and deterrent and respond to the
generalized belief that traffickers are in the illegal business for the money. If
traffickers are deprived of their illegally obtained assets and income, they
would not engage in the business. Again, the deterrent effect of these policies,
as is the case with other anti-drug policies, can be relevant, but it is unknown.
Money laundering is a process designed to hide and disguise the origin of
revenues and assets to prevent them from being confiscated and seized by
the government and to allow their owners to use them in the legal economy
without suspicion. In countries or regions where drug trafficking is socially
accepted, drug revenues and the assets accumulated through trafficking are
illegal but socially legitimate and do not need to be hidden. In those cases
drug traffickers have frequently flaunted their wealth and are socially
recognized as successful businessmen and women. In situations where
traffickers have private protective armies, their need to launder capital to
disguise its origin is less pressing and if their armed organizations are strong
enough they might not really need to launder. The incentives and need to
launder illicitly accumulated capital depend on the social environment and
mores, and the law enforcement agencies’ power relative to that of the drug
traffickers.
 The money laundering literature focuses on the financial system. There
are three steps in the process of laundering in this system. First, cash has to
be deposited in an account. Second, a series of electronic transfers are done
among accounts from several jurisdictions, particularly financial off-shore
centers to hide the origin of the funds. Third,  the capital can then be invested
or disposed off in the legal economy without raising suspicions about its
origin. Most money laundering controls are designed to thwart this process.
Banks are required to report to authorities cash deposits over $10,000 and
all suspicious transactions, they are also required to establish “know your
client mechanisms” and internal auditing systems to prevent corruption within
the banks. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime has developed
model anti-money laundering laws and provides technical assistance for
countries and off-shore centers to adopt them.
Laundering capital of Andean drug exporters requires several steps.
Revenues from drug exports have to be deposited in the banking system
abroad, many times in off-shore banking facilities. After several transactions
to hide their origin, these funds can then be transferred to bank accounts
and invested in the Andean countries. Other systems, however, appear to be
frequently used. For example, cash (US dollars) is transported to the Andean
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countries where it is sold to money exchange agencies, tourists, importers or
other individuals who demand foreign exchange. Contraband provides another
way to bring those funds into the Andean countries. Goods paid with cash
are purchased in international markets and smuggled into the countries where
they are sold to obtain local currencies. Some forms of “technical contraband,”
like import under-invoicing and export over-invoicing are also used for these
purposes.
After the capital is brought into the country and converted to local currency
it can be invested. However, the need to hide its origin still remains since in
poor countries anyone who invests even a few million dollars is conspicuous.
Drug traffickers need to have legal business to provide a façade and protect
their capital. Real estate is a favorite venue for this activity. In the Andean
countries the real estate market is imperfect, prices and values are not
transparent and transactions can be recorded at prices substantially lower
than the real ones. Art and jewelry, goods that are difficult to price accurately,
are also used to launder.
Successful anti-money laundering policies require the cooperation of the
private sector (banking, real estate, retail stores, etc) and the coordination of
several government agencies (customs, banking overseers, internal revenue,
police, the judicial system, etc). Asset seizures and expropriations are not
legally simple procedures. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the legal
system is to protect private property rights. Not surprisingly, successful
expropriations of drug traffickers’ assets in the Andean countries have not
been common although recent changes in the Colombian laws appear to
have been able to change this. A frequent problem faced by Colombian
governments has been the reversal of seizures and expropriations after le-
gal appeals. In some cases, the government has been required to pay large
compensations to those who recovered seized assets.
In some American jurisdictions local police departments have been
empowered to expropriate assets used in drug dealing, to sell them and use
those funds to increase their own budgets. These rather extreme cases
have led to the expropriation of rented houses used by drug dealers without
any knowledge by the owners. These measures have distorted law enforce-
ment activities in some places as police departments have devoted their
resources to go after victimless crimes that increase their budgets
disregarding other crimes.34
34 United States Representative Henry Hyde’s (1995) book presents a good summary of these
problems.
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Anti-money laundering policies produce high profile cases like the
expropriation of Pablo Escobar’s hacienda “Nápoles” that was finalized in
August 2004, more than 10 years after Escobar’s death. Nine years after
the capture of the Cali cartel leaders, on September 2004, the Colombia
government seized some of their properties. These policies, however, do not
seem to have made a significant dent on traffickers’ wealth. Indeed, the
assets expropriated are at most a small proportion of any estimate of the
wealth accumulated by drug traffickers or their annual revenues. This
questions the relevance of the deterrent effect of these policies.
f. Some General Considerations
Anti-drug policies require remarkable coordination among government
agencies, governmental and private foreign donors, NGOs and private sec-
tor actors. This is a main policy challenge. In many places police and army
are frequently antagonistic and distrust each other. Everywhere bureaucracies
protect their turf, American government officials tend to distrust their
counterparts in the Andes and vice-versa. Actors in the war on drugs want
to show results and sometimes act hastily without sharing their plans with
other relevant agents. Not surprisingly, anti-drug actions frequently reveal
great lack of coordination. The Andean countries are poor, underdeveloped
and have week states. One may question if the required policy coordination
is actually feasible in those countries. Indeed, if they could actually coordinate
all anti-drug policies, one may wonder if they would not have had strong
enough states and governments so that the illegal drug industry would not
have established itself in the first place!
Corruption is another issue related to policy formulation and implemen-
tation. Most anti-drug policies put government officials at risk of corruption.35
This requires a continuous and strict watchdog system for every policy that
would demand a degree of governmental sophistication and commitment
that the Andean countries probably lack.
Finally, all these policies, except for AD, deal with illegal drugs as a law
enforcement problem. There is no question that law enforcement is part of
the problem but if the government answer is mainly repressive, chances of
long-term success are rather low. It is as if policies were formulated based
on a simple model that divided people into law abiding and law-breaking
groups and the latter had to be controlled and punished without attempting to
understand why law breaking behaviors are so much more common in some
locations, societies, countries and times than in others.
35 This is one important reason why the United States army has been hesitant to participate in
the “war on drugs”.
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Current anti-drug policies should not be dismissed outright but they should
be coherent with long-term institutional and structural social changes required
to lower criminal behavior and drug activity in a particular country. If this is
not done, the best that current policies may accomplish is some short-run
successes. Unfortunately, some of these policies actually prevent the
institutional changes needed for long-term success while the emphasis on all
current policies deviates attention from the real changes required.
VII. The Economic, Social and Political Effects
of the Illegal Drugs’ Industry Development
on the Andean Ccountries
The effects of the illegal industry are significant, complex, widespread
and difficult to evaluate. One obvious reason for this is that data about the
industry are sketchy and unreliable. Even orders of magnitude about
traffickers and illegal crop growers’ incomes are hard to come by. Besides,
traffickers’ revenues are not always a good measure of the industry’s
importance in a country. In Colombia, for example, most of the industry’s
profits have been made in the smuggling stage of their business. Ballpark
estimates indicate that a wholesale kilo of cocaine in Colombia sales for
about $1,500. The same kilo wholesale at port of entry in the United States
would sale for about $18,000 and somewhat more in Europe. Traffickers do
not have to bring into Colombia the revenues when they export. Indeed, to
pay suppliers they need only about 10 percent of export revenues that are
paid abroad in foreign currency. What they do with those moneys depends
on their expectations about interest rate differentials between Colombia and
international markets and exchange rates variations (Correa, 1984, Reina,
1996). It has been argued frequently in Bolivia that the absortive capacity of
the economy is too small and traffickers have invested a large part of their
profits abroad (Malamud-Goti, 1994, Mendoza, 1993). Colombians are known
to be part of the drug distribution network in the United States and Europe;
their profits are part of those countries GNP but a proportion of those profits
is invested back in Colombia (Thoumi, 2003a).The basic point is that it is
very difficult to get a good measure of actual drug moneys that enter an
Andean economy and who gets them.
A more subtle and complex issue relates to the causality of the illegal
drug industry. If one has a simple model in which the illegal industry is
exogenous, then it is considered as an external factor, calamity or scourge
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that affects the domestic economy. If on the other hand one accepts the
competitive advantage model discussed in this essay, the illegal industry
locates itself in countries and regions that have a set of institutional and
cultural characteristics that attract it. In this case, the industry is the result
of domestic elements and the causality of the effects of the industry is less
clear. Indeed, in this case it is more relevant to look at the illegal industry as
part of a social process rather than as something that generates direct effects.
Economic models have borrowed methods from physics and mathematics
to determine cause and effect relationships. In the case of drugs it is more
adequate to borrow from biology and look at drugs as part of an evolutionary
process in which causality is not clear-cut.
The effects of the illegal industry depend on the structure and institutions
of a country and the role that such country plays in the illegal industry.36  The
mainly economic effects are varied: “among which the most important and
likely to have occurred are that
1. The industry can cause regional booms and busts in coca-, poppy-, and
marijuana-growing regions and the cities where drug traffickers are
concentrated.
2. Illegal drugs can generate a significant number of jobs, particularly in
coca- and poppy-growing regions.
3. The illegal industry promotes money laundering.
4. It can distort consumption, investment, and import patterns as traffickers
and their associates invest in real estate, machinery, equipment, and goods
that are not the most profitable or socially productive ones but which
facilitate laundering. A similar situation occurs with consumer goods.
5. The abundance of foreign exchange it generates can be a cause of
currency overvaluation and a loss of competitiveness by other exports
and the domestic production that competes with imports.
6. The illegal industry can also increase the expectations of quick wealth
and encourage high-risk speculative investments.” (Thoumi, 2003a: 160).
The industry’s structure has an important effect on the distribution of the
illegally generated income and on a country or region’s income distribution. In
places where the main activity is illicit crop growing, the plantings are in small
farms like in Bolivia and Peru and farmers’ communities are strong, income is
widely distributed and the illegal industry does not have a concentrating effect
36 Thoumi (2003a: chs. 5, 6, 7 and 8) studies these effects in detail.
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on the country’s income distribution. In those cases it can be said that the
income distribution effects tend to be benign. When the main illegal activity is
trafficking and a few syndicates capture most of the revenues generated, the
country’s income and wealth distributions become concentrated. In these cases
social tensions increase and the illegal industry generates a great deal of violence.
The illegal industry also needs an economic environment that facilitates
asset and foreign exchange laundering. Here again the structure of the
country’s economy is important. The size of a country’s economy influences
the traffickers’ ability to launder: the larger the economy, the easier to invest
and spend inconspicuously in it. In effect, any economy has several limits to
launder illegal capital; one is determined by the productive assets that can
be bought in the economy. A second limit is given by the amount of capital
that can be laundered without generating significant law enforcement
reactions. A third limit arises from the need to bring foreign exchange into
the country. In this case, there is a limit to the contraband that can be sold in
the domestic markets and on the capacity to overvalue exports and undervalue
imports, systems used to import the illicit foreign exchange. A problem faced
by traffickers in the Andean countries is that the size of their “laundromats”
is small, requiring the development of a political protection network as their
wealth becomes conspicuous.
The market structure of the economy also determines the capacity to
launder assets. If the modern sector is concentrated in a few financial
conglomerates, they can isolate themselves from the illegal industry. In this
case it would be necessary for those conglomerates to become complicit
with the illegal industry for it to be able to launder in the modern sector.
Because of the limitations to launder assets in the Andean countries, it is
not surprising that real estate investments have been a favorite for drug
traffickers. Real estate in the Andean countries is frequently difficult to
value because real estate and capital markets are imperfect and information
about transactions is spotty. The price of the asset frequently depends on
personal connections and the way payment takes place. Besides, the value
of many transactions is underreported to avoid taxes.
Any illegal enterprise requires a social support network to succeed. In
order to produce and traffic drugs the industry has to bribe and corrupt
officials at the local level. The small size of the Andean economies limits the
ability of traffickers to invest their capital without state protection. To achieve
this, the industry has had to bribe at high levels of the governments.
Looking at the illegal industry as part of a process, it is found that the
effects of the industry through time do not depend on the size of the industry’s
revenues or profits at the time of the effects but rather on the history of the
illegal industry in the country. That is, on the way it inserted itself into the
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economy, how it permeated the political system, on who has gotten the revenues
through time, and on the government policies and their history. The length of
time that the industry has been operating in a country is another important
determinant of its effects. As time goes by the industry’s weakens the country’s
institutions and if the industry lasts enough, it will also change the culture.
The influence of the illicit drug revenues on Bolivia, Colombia and Peru
has varied significantly.  Beginning in the early 1970s and for about 10 years,
the industry’s effects appeared to be positive. In Bolivian and Peru, where the
industry’s main activity was coca growing, benefits spread among a large
number of peasants and the governments benefited from newly found exports.
Indeed, the 1985 macroeconomic adjustment in Bolivia was facilitated by
the presence of the illegal drugs industry. Similarly, illegal drug revenues
played an important role in getting Peru out of its foreign debt and economic
crises generated by the populist policies of Alan Garcia in the late 1980s.
In Colombia, groups of traffickers, “magicians” as they were called in popu-
lar parlance, flaunted their newfound wealth, excited public imagination and
appeared to many as role models and ideals to be followed to achieve upward
social mobility. In a country that had been subject to a tight foreign exchange
constraint since the mid 1950s, an industry that generated large amounts of
foreign exchange was perceived positively.
In the three Andean countries the illegal drugs industry generated “Dutch
disease” effects in coca growing regions and in cities where the main traffickers
were based. Urban real estate booms appeared in those cities as traffickers inves-
ted their capital. In Colombia the illegal industry development also resulted in
rural land concentration as many industry actors purchased large plots of land.
As noted, drug traffickers in the three Andean countries needed political
support for their activities and to protect their newly acquired assets. The
political systems of the Andean countries became more vulnerable to illegal
drugs income than their economies.
 In Bolivia, a country with a strong military and an authoritarian tradition,
the military became active actors in the illegal industry. The short-lived regime
of General Garcia-Meza in 1980 was the first time that a trafficking
organization took over a government (Gamarra, 1994). In Peru the influence
of drugs in politics and the armed forces has been subtler but the activities of
Vladimiro Montesinos during the Alberto Fujimori administration illustrate
the penetration of the illegal drug industry in Peruvian politics and armed
forces (Dammert Ego-Aguirre, 2001, Rospigliosi, 2001).
Drug revenues in Colombia were larger and a lot more concentrated than
in Bolivia and Peru and required a stronger social support network. Because
Colombia did not have the same strong military and authoritarian tradition as
the other two Andean countries, the influence of the illegal drug industry
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was quite different and affected the political system more directly.  By the
late 1970s they already had become principal political campaign financiers
and the illicit industry’s funding of the campaign of the president elected on
1994 led to an unprecedented political crisis. The threat of extradition from
the early -1980s an exacerbated the traffickers’ need to have a large political
support network and they used all means at their disposal to intimidate and
purchase politicians. Indeed, they unleashed an unprecedented narco-terrorist
campaign against those who challenged them within the justice system or in
politics. The illegal industry in Colombia has generated a lot more violence
than anywhere else in the world.
 In Peru and Colombia the illicit drug industry has also funded subversive
groups and in Colombia it also finances counter-subversive paramilitary
organizations. In the 1980s Shinning Path in Peru obtained funding from “taxes”
on coca growers and traffickers. During the 1990s as coca fields grew in
Colombia, FARC and some ELN fronts also collected moneys from peasants
and traffickers. Some of the Colombian paramilitary groups originated as private
protection armies of drug traffickers who purchased cheap lands in areas
where guerrilla activity had depressed land values. They have been related
more directly to trafficking that the left wing guerrillas.
Peasants in the three Andean countries have used illicit crops as a venue
to attain some recognition and political power. Bolivian peasants are well
organized in “syndicates” and as noted, for the first time in the country’s
history Indian candidates representing coca growers have a real possibility
to become presidents. In Peru peasants have become politically organized
around coca issues and are pressing the government. In Colombia peasants
are less organized but coca has become the source of their newly gained
political leverage.
 The growth of the illegal drugs industry has internationalized domestic
Andean conflicts and issues. The development of the illegal industry has put
the Andean countries on the radar of the United States and European countries.
In Bolivia the presence of the United States has been conspicuous for over
two decades. In Colombia during the last 10 years it has grown dramatically.
Today Colombia is the fifth recipient of foreign United States aid behind Is-
rael, Egypt, Afghanistan and Iraq. Drug related issues have also become key
issues in the relations of Colombia with Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Brazil.
The internationalization of domestic conflicts and the intertwining of those
conflicts with the illegal industry have increased the complexity of the social
issues and conflicts in the Andean countries and have made any solution
more difficult to achieve. Today the peasant, subversion, counter-subversion
and drug problems are all interrelated and their solutions are interdependent
on each other.
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The short and long-term effects of the illegal drug industry vary subs-
tantially. In the short run the economic effects can be positive and are simi-
lar to those of a boom in primary products. There is a group whose income
increases substantially, there is a significant inflow of foreign exchange,
some people become rich quickly, their expenditure has a significant multiplier
effect, the currency revalues, in coca and poppy growing regions employment
increases, etc. There is however, a significant difference with other booms
as the state has no way to tax illicit revenues.
In the long run the effects of illegal industry growth have been extremely
negative. The illegal industry exacerbates political corruption, encourages
other criminal activities, weakens the rule of law and increases transaction
costs for everyone in the economy. The illegal drugs industry locates itself in
a country that is vulnerable, where the rule of law is weak and social
behavioral controls lax and acts as a catalyst that worsens the country’s
institutional deficiencies.
This negative catalytic effect of the industry has expressed itself in the
three Andean countries more clearly in the political sphere and social
institutions than in the economy. In other words the social and political effects
have been negative and more important than the economic effects of the
industry. The cases of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru illustrate this point.
According to all estimates, from 1970 to 2000 the share of the GDP generated
by illegal drugs in Bolivia and Peru was significantly higher than in Colom-
bia. Yet, the negative effects of the industry were a lot greater in Colombia
than in the other countries. Furthermore, in all three countries the illegal
industry’s share of GDP has declined substantially during the last 25 years
but the effects of the industry today generate a lot more social and political
instability than in the past. The point is that the economic benefits of the
illegal industry depend mostly on today’s revenues and how they are used.
In Colombia those revenues were used in the past to accumulate wealth.
Today, a significant share of those revenues contributes to the armed conflict
and to wealth destruction. The negative social, political and economic effects
of the illegal industry do not depend only on today’s revenues but mainly on
the history of the illegal industry, on how it has penetrated society and polity
and how those funds have been used in the past.  The illicit drugs industry
has been like a mermaid that attracted the marines on a boat to sink it.
The reliance of guerrillas and paramilitary forces on drug funds illustrates
the devastating long-term consequences of the illicit industry’s development
in Colombia. While in the 1970s the drug industry was seen as a good busi-
ness that enriched the country, by the 1990s its revenues contributed greatly
to wealth destruction instead of accumulation. The illicit industry has also
been a catalytic element that has changed the culture and institutions. People
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have become more materialistic and money oriented, seek quick results and
the rule of law has weakened.
VIII. A Few Policy Recommendations Aimed
at Lowering the Degree of Policy Debate
Conflict and Promoting a Better Dialogue
It is difficult to recommend drug policy changes because the process of
policy formulation does not allow for a reasonable policy evaluation and
change. Before policies can be modified and improved, it is necessary to
promote a policy debate aimed at lowering the level of conflict between
those who promote and those who oppose current policies. The drug
“problem” is one of social structure, institutions and culture. As it is the case
with institutional studies, in the present case one comes strong on diagnosis
and short on recommendations. A few policy suggestions, however, could
be ventured to improve the debate and to weaken the conflict around illicit
drugs. This is done knowing that the policies suggested will not solve the
“drug problem” in the short run but will hopefully help generate a process of
institutional and culture change that may bring long term success.
First, as noted above, coca’s position in the United Nations conventions
is unclear. On the one hand, the conventions do not allow coca to be used
except for medical and scientific research purposes and on the other, its
traditional uses are allowed as long as they take place in the regions where
there is historical evidence of prior use. The international agencies could
undertake a serious study and a program to encourage small changes to the
Conventions.
Changing the conventions to allow coca’s traditional and possible indus-
trial uses everywhere as long as they do not lead to cocaine production would
help eliminate some of the frictions between peasants in Bolivia and Peru
and the rest of the society in those countries. This change would mitigate
social resentment and would help advance a dialogue among conflicting
groups. This change would entail tolerance for the non-medical and non-
research use of minute quantities of cocaine like those found in coca tea. Of
course, it can be argued that coca tea has a medical use to combat high
altitude sickness (“soroche”) but this is not be case of tea consumed at sea
level. This change is consistent with the evidence that shows that that coca
tea is not addictive and does not lead to cocaine use or addiction.
The opposition to the proposed change would argue that tolerating even
a minute amount of cocaine use would open the gates for tolerating other
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drugs’ recreational uses and lead to a slippery slope that would end up
legalizing all drugs. The issue here is an empirical one and it should be
researched. The slippery slope argument assumes that the goal of those
who advocate policy changes is a free market without restrictions. There
is only a very small and rather irrelevant minority of drug policy change
promoters that aim at that result. The overwhelming majority simply seek
more effective policies and lower social costs associated with drug pro-
duction, trafficking and consumption.
A complementary initiative would be the elaboration of a good study of
coca demand for traditional and industrial uses aiming to organize the market
for licit coca in Bolivia, Peru and Northern Argentina where the coca chewing
habit persists. In Bolivia and Peru there are legal coca plantings to satisfy
traditional demand and few industrial users. For example, coca-cola
purchases coca leaves from the government agencies that are in charge of
controlling and regulating those markets.
In Bolivia and Peru there is no real knowledge of the size of licit demand,
including consumption of Bolivian coca in Northern Argentina. There is also
confusion about the extent and nature of the rights to produce legal coca.
For example, in Peru the Empresa Nacional de Coca (ENACO) has a registry
of legal coca growers that dates to 1978. The original registry included 25,148
growers. Many have died others have stopped growing coca and others are
likely to have moved to the black market. In late 2002 ENACO had only
7,910 active registered producers. ENACO finances itself from the difference
between its purchasing and selling price, in fact placing the burden of coca
market control on licit producers and consumers. This situation has generated
a black market of coca for licit uses. ENACO itself is not clear about whether
the registry authorizes coca in the plots owned by peasants registered or if
the registry only authorized individuals to plant coca. In other words, it is not
clear whether the right was personal or attached to the land. The issue of
whether those rights can be inherited is also unclear. The situation is made
more confusing by Fujimori’s measure to de-penalize coca growers in the
early 1990s. As it stands, illicit coca is penalized and can be eradicated but
coca growers are not penalized. The government is aware of the confusing
situation of coca and has tried to formulate a new coca law unsuccessfully.
The situation in Bolivia is also confusing. Legal coca is supposed to be
produced on 12,000 in Yungas. However, peasants argue that current plantings
are less than that and they have expanded plantings in Yungas. Their position
is that they should be allowed to grow as much coca on 12,000 hectares as
it is physicality possible, irrespective of demand.
These two cases open opportunities to establish modern controlled markets
for coca in both countries. Indeed, if the United Nations modifies the conventions
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and allows non-medical and research coca uses, it can also develop a market
control mechanism similar to the one it has for poppy used to produce heroin
and codeine in which the International Narcotics Control Board established
production quotas in some countries and oversees the local control systems.
As noted, USAID is funding a study to determine licit coca demand in Peru.
Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that the results of this study be accepted by
the peasants as they greatly distrust the United States and the Peruvian
Governments. A study funded by international agencies including researchers
recommended by the Bolivian and Peruvian governments as well as interna-
tional NGOs and peasant organizations would have widespread credibility and
contribute to a better understanding among the contending groups.
Another important contribution would be to open a sensible debate to
clarify the environmental effects of aerial spraying. The current debate is
clouded in misunderstandings, half-truths and falsehoods. The effects of
aerial spraying can be successful regarding the short-term coca and poppy
supply but they may have devastating health and environment effects in the
medium and long run. Knowledge about these possible effects is very
uncertain. The high altitude tropical forests eradicated are almost impossible
to recover. Those forests are the main source of water in Colombia. The
deforestation of the Amazon can also have large weather altering effects in
the planet. The point is that in the zeal to fight the “war on drugs”, we might
be creating an environmental catastrophe of great magnitude. The main
argument of eradicators is that coca plantings and cocaine manufacturing
by themselves do a great deal of environmental damage. This is certainly
true, but it does not exonerate anyone from destroying even more environ-
ment. The simple point is that if someone does something bad, it does not
allow me to do the same.
A policy paper on AD exploring the consequences of AD being a counter
project would also be a good contribution to the drug debate. Some of the
issues that should be raised are the need for permanent monitoring and the
question of AD financing. AD has been welcomed by illicit crop producing
countries as long as they are paid by foreign donors. A question to be explored
is under which conditions should illicit crop growing countries fund highly
questionable counter projects and increase their national debt? Putting the
same question in a broader form, how does one evaluate the results of a
counter project? Answering these questions would contribute to better policy
debate and policy formulation and implementation.
Summarizing, the main role that international agencies may play in
confronting illicit drug issues would be to introduce a cool head and promote
a serious science based debate on drug issues. This would include both
social and natural sciences and would be a first step in promoting policy
The causes of illegal drug industry.p65 4/10/2005, 2:17 PM53
Francisco E. Thoumi
54
reform, to encourage the development of better social controls to drug
consumption, trafficking and production and to breach the gap that currently
exists across countries and scientific disciplines in their views about mind-
altering drug phenomena.
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